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BREAKING FAITH: 
MACHIAVELLI AND MORAL RISKS  
IN LAWYER NEGOTIATION 
 
MICHAEL S. MCGINNISS 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the ethics of lawyer negotiation through the 
viciously scratched lens of Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince, in which he 
advises political rulers about what he considers realistic principles for 
decision making and action.  For background, the article introduces some 
core elements of Machiavelli’s moral philosophy and its often subtle but 
nevertheless persisting influence on the American legal profession and the 
practice of negotiation.  After reviewing the most important aspects of the 
law of lawyer negotiation, it considers concepts of risk in the negotiation 
process, including informational and moral risks.  The article proposes that 
negotiation practices manifesting Machiavellian faith breaking and 
“effectual truth,” rather than a lawyer’s commitment to good faith and 
honest dealing, create moral risks of harm to lawyer integrity, as well as to 
relationships with clients and within the community.  It concludes by 
advancing a realistic ideal for virtuous negotiation, founded in the keeping 
of faith with opposing counsel and parties, and promoting the virtues of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
False words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul 
with evil. 
—Socrates1 
How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his faith, and to live 
with honesty and not by astuteness, everyone understands.  
Nonetheless one sees by experience in our times that the princes 
who have done great things are those who have taken little 
account of faith and have known how to get around men’s brains 
with their astuteness; and in the end they have overcome those 
who have founded themselves on loyalty. 
—Machiavelli2 
American legal scholar and literary critic James Boyd White has 
described the practice of law as “the experience of making and remaking 
language under pressure.”3  This pressure exists, in some form and degree, 
in each task a lawyer may be called upon to perform in representing a 
client.  It exists in the ethical challenges a lawyer confronts when 
reconciling competing professional duties and in reconciling those duties 
with the dictates of the lawyer’s personal conscience.4  It exists when a 
lawyer advises a client, and in doing so must exercise independent 
professional judgment, render candid advice, and decide whether and how 
to offer counseling on moral considerations relevant to the client’s 
situation.5  And, as White examined through the virtuous and idealistic lens 
of Socrates’ dialogue in Plato’s Gorgias,6 this pressure exists when a 
 
1. PLATO, Phaedo, reprinted in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 385, 475 (115e) (Benjamin 
Jowett trans., Oxford at the Clarendon Press 4th ed. 1953).  
2. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 68-69 (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998) (1531). 
3. James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato’s Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 882 (1983) [hereinafter White, The Ethics of Argument].   
4. See Michael S. McGinniss, Virtue Ethics, Earnestness, and the Deciding Lawyer: Human 
Flourishing in a Legal Community, 87 N.D. L. REV. 19 (2011) [hereinafter McGinniss, Virtue 
Ethics] (noting “the moral challenges lawyers face because of their ethical position as individuals 
owing competing professional duties to clients, the courts, and other persons who are affected by 
the actions of lawyers and their clients”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 7 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2015) (“[A] lawyer is . . . guided by personal conscience.”). 
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); see also Michael 
S. McGinniss, Virtue and Advice: Socratic Perspectives on Lawyer Independence and Moral 
Counseling of Clients, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter McGinniss, Virtue and Advice] 
(examining the ethical and moral responsibilities of lawyers in their role as advisors to clients, 
“with continual reference to . . . Socrates,” and proposing, as an ideal for moral counseling, a 
conception of the lawyer as a “trustworthy neighbor”). 
6. “Plato’s Gorgias is about the ‘ethics’ of argument in a literal sense of that term (which in 
Greek means both ‘habit’ and ‘character’) for the main issue to which it returns again and again is 
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lawyer advocates on behalf of a client before a tribunal, or by 
communications with opposing counsel or with an unrepresented party. 
This article will examine the ethics of lawyer negotiation through the 
viciously scratched lens of Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince, in which he 
advises political rulers about what he considers realistic principles for 
decision making and action.  The foremost concern of this article will be the 
moral risks to integrity, clients, and community a lawyer takes when, for the 
sake of achieving an adversarial advantage in negotiations, the lawyer 
becomes a Machiavellian “breaker of faith.”7  Part II introduces some core 
elements of Machiavelli’s moral philosophy and its often subtle but 
nevertheless persisting influence on the American legal profession and the 
practice of negotiation.  Part III reviews the most important aspects of the 
law of lawyer negotiation found in professional conduct codes and in 
common law principles of civil liability.  Part IV considers the concept of 
risk in lawyer negotiation, including: (1) “informational risks” and the 
conventional understanding of negotiation as a “game” whose objective is 
to resolve informational risks to the advantage of the client; and (2) “moral 
risks,” and how negotiation practices manifesting Machiavellian faith 
breaking and “effectual truth,”8 rather than a lawyer’s commitment to good 
faith and honest dealing, create moral risks of harm to lawyer integrity, as 
well as relationships with clients and within the community.  Finally, Part V 
will advance a realistic ideal for virtuous negotiation, founded in the 
keeping of faith with opposing counsel and parties, and promoting the 
virtues of respect for other persons, loyalty to clients, and justice from fair 
processes. 
II. MACHIAVELLI, LEGAL ETHICS, AND THE MODERN 
PROFESSIONAL 
Niccolò Machiavelli was an Italian Renaissance political theorist and 
the author of The Prince, which his prominent interpreter and translator 
Harvey C. Mansfield has called “the most famous book on politics ever 
 
the kind of character a person defines for himself and offers to others—the kind of life and 
community he makes—when he chooses to think and talk in one way rather than in another.”  
White, The Ethics of Argument, supra note 3, at 849. 
7. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 62. 
8. “[S]ince my intent is to write something useful to whoever understands it, it has appeared 
to me more fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it.”  
MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 61 (emphasis added).  See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, 
MACHIAVELLI’S VIRTUE (1966) [hereinafter MANSFIELD, MACHIAVELLI’S VIRTUE] (observing 
Machiavelli rejected “the [Aristotelian] principle that a thing should be defined by its excellence,” 
instead “demanding the ‘effectual truth,’ in which a thing is defined by its upshot or outcome”). 
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written.”9  Machiavelli was a contemporary of both Martin Luther in 
Germany10 and Thomas More in England.11  But besides their 
contemporaneity, they had little in common.  The philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre has described Machiavelli as the “Luther of secular power,”12 
and More’s self-sacrificing relinquishment of secular power in deference to 
the dictates of his Christianity-formed conscience13 stands in stark contrast 
with Machiavelli’s advocacy of self-preservation in and through power as 
the highest principle for social and political life.14  For Machiavelli, 
“[m]oral rules are technical rules about the means to these ends.”15  
Moreover, such “rules” are to be discerned, and ensuing actions to be 
judged, not by reference to any a priori standards, objectively grounded in 
either theological or secular-rationalist truths, “but solely in terms of their 
consequences.”16  Machiavelli commits himself to the notion that 
 
9. Harvey C. Mansfield, Introduction to NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE vii (Harvey C. 
Mansfield trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998) (1531).  Machiavelli was born in 1469 and 
died in 1527.  Id. at xxix-xxxi. 
10. Martin Luther (1483–1546), a German priest and theologian, was a leading figure in the 
Protestant Reformation.  See Harold J. Berman & John Witte, Jr., The Transformation of Western 
Legal Philosophy in Lutheran Germany, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1660 (1989). 
11. Thomas More (1478–1535) has been described as “the patron saint of Catholic lawyers.”  
Veryl Victoria Miles, A Legal Career for All Seasons: Remembering St. Thomas More’s Vocation, 
20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 419, 420 (2006).  After refusing on grounds of 
faithful conscience to take the Oath of Supremacy to King Henry VIII, he was convicted of 
treason and executed based on perjured testimony.  Id. at 422-23.   
12. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 127 (2d ed. 1998).   
13. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Principled Resignation of Thomas More, 31 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 63, 72-73 (1997) (examining More’s “principled resignation” as Lord High 
Chancellor based on King Henry VIII’s claim “to absolute authority over the church”).  In contrast 
to Machiavelli’s secular prince, who “was to act solely from considerations of power politics,” for 
Luther “the Christian prince . . . should be inspired to govern in a decent and godly way, 
promoting the well-being of his subjects.  This was interpreted to mean that a ruler in the earthly 
kingdom should not tolerate any injustice but should defend against and punish evil and should 
help, protect, and maintain the right, according to what each one’s office or station may require.”  
Berman & Witte, supra note 10, at 1593-94 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 
14. “For Machiavelli the ends of social and political life are given.  They are the attainment 
and holding down of power, the maintenance of political order and general prosperity, and these 
latter, in part at least, because unless you maintain them, you will not continue to hold power.”  
MACINTYRE, supra note 12, at 127. 
15. Id. at 128.  Although Machiavelli’s moral relativism dispenses with any concept of 
absolute truth (rationalist or otherwise), his philosophy reflects his desire for human beings to 
exercise maximum “rational control” for the ends of self-preservation and aggrandizement, 
particularly through the manipulation of others.  “What is rational control? . . . [T]he idea of 
modernity.  That idea requires subjecting our entire lives, holding nothing back—which means 
holding nothing sacred as exempt—to an examination by our reason as to whether we can live 
more effectively. . . .”  Harvey C. Mansfield, Rational Control, or, Life without Virtue, NEW 
CRITERION, Sept. 2006, at 39, 39.  As Mansfield observes, “The idea of rational control was 
conceived by Machiavelli and continued by a series of modern philosophers who followed him 
and considered themselves a movement.”  Id. at 40. 
16. MACINTYRE, supra note 12, at 128. 
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“consequences are calculable,”17 and that “[t]he study of history yields 
empirical generalizations from which we can derive causal maxims,” to be 
used as each given occasion arises “to influence other people, rather than as 
answers to the question, What am I to do?”18 
As Mansfield explains, Machiavelli’s moral philosophy rebels against 
the ideas explored and embraced by the Greek philosophers Plato and 
Aristotle, rejecting their search to understand the true and the good as 
ultimate realities having intrinsic value beyond their useful effects:19 
For Machiavelli, reason does not cooperate with imagination 
to see the perfection of a thing.  The very virtues constituting the 
perfection of the soul according to Plato and Aristotle must not be 
understood as perfect or part of perfection.  They are “qualities,” a 
neutral term, that bring “either blame or praise,” to be appreciated 
as they appear to others only as effects.  Their effectual truth is 
quite different from the truth one imagines when they are merely 
thought out without regard to their effect.  When looked at from 
the standpoint of effectual truth, the virtues that Socrates induced 
from his companions because they were true or real virtue turn out 
to be apparent virtue quite opposed to effectual virtue, now said to 
be real virtue.  Machiavelli reverses the upward course of Socratic 
argumentation and brings it “down to earth.”  The effect, and not 
the intent understood as intent toward perfection, is the locus of 
good, and when judging the intent from the standpoint of the 
effect, vice, or some combination of vice and virtue, is more 




18. Id. (emphasis added). 
19. Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Enterprise, NEW CRITERION, Oct. 2013, at 4, 9 
[hereinafter Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Enterprise].  He explains: 
To reform contemplative philosophy, Machiavelli moved to assert the necessities 
of the world against the intelligibility of the heavenly cosmos and the supra-heavenly 
whole.  His nature, as opposed to that of Plato or Aristotle, lacked the lasting or 
eternal intelligibilities of nature as they conceived it.  To assert the claim of nature 
against theology Machiavelli changes nature into the world, or, more precisely, 
because the world is not an intelligible whole, into “worldly things.”  This world is the 
world of sense. 
Id. at 9. 
20. Id. at 9-10 (emphases added) (quoting MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 61).  Mansfield 
notes, “The well-known phrase verità effettuale, announcing what is loosely called Machiavelli’s 
realism, occurs just this once in all of Machiavelli’s writings and nowhere else, so far as I know, 
in any other writings of the Renaissance.”  MANSFIELD, MACHIAVELLI’S VIRTUE, supra note 8, at 
19.   
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Accordingly, for Machiavelli, the “effectual truth” about virtue “is 
what it gets you.  But virtue gets you ‘ruin rather than preservation’ unless 
you ‘learn how to be able not to be good.’”21  And “[w]hen Machiavelli 
praises virtue, it would seem necessary to make the ability to do evil a part 
of virtue.”22  Nevertheless, “such vicious virtue achieves its effect only in 
contrast with what people usually expect from virtue, [which is] that it not 
include vice.  Thus Machiavelli’s notion of virtue, which welcomes the 
vices, must continue to coexist with the old notion, which is repelled by 
them.”23  A person’s decision to use the ability “not to be good” should be 
made “according to necessity.”24  And in each case, what “necessity” exists 
and what it requires as to action is decided with an unrelenting focus on the 
desired objectives of obtaining and maintaining power, and preserving 
oneself and benefiting those who are beneficial to oneself.25  He believes 
“[n]ecessity simplifies by ‘going directly’ to the effect without regard to 
opposing claims and doubtful or contradictory reasonings [about what is 
‘good.’]  Machiavelli recommends acting first and reasoning—
rationalizing—afterwards.”26 
Lawyers, too, have been known to act first and rationalize afterwards.27  
When such action involves dishonesty—i.e., breaking faith―in the practice 
 
21. MANSFIELD, MACHIAVELLI’S VIRTUE, supra note 8, at 19 (emphases added) (quoting 
NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 15 (1531) (Mansfield’s translation)). 
 22. Id. 
23. Id.  “Machiavelli questions the primacy of the good and dethrones it as the object of 
human action.  Men do not have a natural preference for real or true good as opposed to what is 
merely apparent, as was the basis for Socrates’s arguments.  They are satisfied (‘satisfied’ and 
‘stupefied’) with the apparent good they see in ‘good effects,’ especially if they are impressive or 
sensational.  Good effects are what they appear to be; they are deeds, fait accomplis.”  Id. 
24. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 61 (emphasis added).  
25. See MANSFIELD, MACHIAVELLI’S VIRTUE, supra note 8, at 19 (observing that to 
Machiavelli, “[v]irtue is not for its own sake and not for the sake of self-improvement but for the 
use of others—subjects and friends—in self-aggrandizement”). 
26. Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Enterprise, supra note 19, at 11.  Beyond his discarding the 
idealism of classical moral philosophy, there is evidence in his writings that Machiavelli regarded 
Christianity and its doctrines with disdain, though one he took care to avoid expressing too 
conspicuously.  “Although it is true . . . that sprinkled throughout Machiavelli’s writings” are 
multiple references to God, “just behind this orthodox veneer lies a forceful criticism of not only 
the clergy, but also Christianity itself.”  VICKIE B. SULLIVAN, MACHIAVELLI’S THREE ROMES: 
RELIGION, HUMAN LIBERTY, AND POLITICS REFORMED 4 (1996).  As Machiavelli would have it, 
Christian doctrines have “enfeebled human beings,” reducing “all politics to fundamental 
weakness” when a ruler adheres to “Christian notions of such politically important conceptions 
such as cruelty, humility, and human virtue.”  Id. at 5. 
27. “In response to a lawyer’s statement that ‘[telling the truth in civil litigation] is, of 
course, a very attractive proposition.  But . . . while it might be nice in a perfect world, it is not the 
way the system operates in litigation in this country,’ the indignant court in Monsanto Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co., 593 A.2d 1013 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) stated that ‘I am compelled in the 
strongest way possible to reject counsel’s observations as being so repugnant and so odious to fair 
minded people that it can only be considered as anathema to any system of civil justice under 
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of negotiation, the lawyer who looks will find multiple sources of support 
for rationalizing it: these include various legal ethics and negotiation 
scholars, the customs of practice in a particular legal community, and even, 
in some regards, the professional conduct rules themselves.28  Among the 
scholarly advocates of calculated faith breaking, Machiavelli has at times 
been explicitly identified for his influence.  In a leading 1980 article entitled 
Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 
James J. White insists the use of deception is essential to an effective 
negotiation: “The critical difference between those who are successful 
negotiators and those who are not lies in [the] capacity both to mislead and 
not to be misled.”29  As for customs of practice, recent empirical studies 
about lawyers’30 and law students’31 negotiation-related ethics reflect that 
attitudes either tolerating or embracing the carefully measured use of 
deception are rather widespread in the legal profession.32  Finally, this 
 
law.’”  David Barnhizer, The Virtue of Ordered Conflict: A Defense of the Adversary System, 79 
NEB. L. REV. 657, 707 n.144 (2000). 
28. As David Barnhizer has noted, the legal profession’s experiences (and struggles) with 
truthfulness in the adversary process have not occurred in a cultural vacuum: 
[T]he lack of truth and even more importantly the unwillingness to pursue truth as a 
critical precondition of resolving disputes and obtaining social goods has permeated 
our entire society.  In our “progressive” society, truth has increasingly become the 
victim of outcome.  As undesirable as our “culture of lies” might be, it represents a 
largely irreversible phenomenon.  Coping with the culture we have created leaves us 
with the need for strong dispute resolution systems, ones with a power sufficient to 
“overawe” competing interests to the extent sufficient to ensure the decisions, once 
rendered, are complied with.  
Barnhizer, supra note 27, at 708-09.  He further opines that despite “claims to the contrary, the 
adversary system is not directed toward ascertaining truth.  It is about obtaining and protecting 
shares of power for specific interests.”  Id. at 709.  In so describing the adversary system, 
Barnhizer is effectively invoking (though not by name) Machiavelli and his moral philosophy of 
“effectual truth.”  See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. 
29. 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 927 (1980) [hereinafter White, Machiavelli and the 
Bar]; see also Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive 
Self-Help, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 481, 481 n.1 (2009) (citing STUDIES IN 
MACHIAVELLIANISM (Richard Christie & Florence L. Geis eds., 1970), and its discussion of 
“studies indicating that people who demonstrate strength in a personality variable called 
‘Machiavellianism’ are more likely to lie when they need to do so, better able to tell lies without 
feeling anxious, and more persuasive and effective in their lies”). 
30. Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attorney 
Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95 (2011). 
31. Andrew Hogan, Note, The Naïve Negotiator: An Empirical Study of First-Year Law 
School Students’ Truth-telling Ethics, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 725 (2013). 
32. See Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 30, at 147-50 (survey data revealing a substantial 
number of practicing lawyers “would violate the requirements of [the current ethics rules] by 
agreeing to engage in a blatantly fraudulent negotiation tactic” involving deception by omission, 
“if asked to do so by their client”); Hogan, supra note 31, at 738 (2012 first-year law student 
survey reflecting “the majority of respondents [were] uncomfortable making an untrue statement 
or would not risk making a possibly untrue statement, even if the client would benefit,” but also 
that “the vast majority of respondents are risk-prone to omissions that would benefit their client or 
do not see the omission as a risk”).  In an interesting 1989 study, Scott S. Dahl asked fourteen 
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persistent strain of Machiavellian moral philosophy has found its way into 
and persisted within the professional conduct standards promulgated by the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) and implemented by most states. 
III. THE LAW OF LAWYER NEGOTIATION 
Against this backdrop of Machiavellian moral philosophy, the law of 
lawyer negotiation has evolved and taken root in the American legal 
profession.  This article will now outline and assess some of the key 
elements and interpretations of the professional conduct rules (including 
significant alternative approaches that have not been embraced by the 
profession) and identify several important common law principles of civil 
liability relating to negotiations. 
A. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“Rules”) specifically carves out “negotiator” as one of several “functions” 
a lawyer performs in representing clients and declares that “[a]s negotiator, 
a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with 
requirements of honest dealings with others.”33  In the same paragraph, the 
Preamble describes the function of an “advocate” as one in which “a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary 
system.”34  This treatment of “negotiator” and “advocate” as distinct 
functions is consistent with the larger organization and headings employed 
by the Rules (with the series of Rules under the heading “Advocate” 
focused on a lawyer’s ethical obligations in matters that involve 
proceedings, whether adjudicative or nonadjudicative).35  Nevertheless, 
from the standpoint of legal ethics, negotiating is best understood as a 
function performed by a lawyer acting in the role of an advocate—one who 
 
lawyers with active civil litigation practices a series of detailed questions about various aspects of 
negotiation ethics, including a question about the desirability or feasibility of a “fairness or good 
faith standard to be imposed on negotiating attorneys.’”  Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: 
Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 8 REV. LITIG. 173, 180-81, 194 (1989).  One respondent 
“pointed out that ‘everything is on the table in a negotiation, and if you get “out-foxed” then that’s 
your problem.’  A colorful attorney remarked that the idea [of a good faith standard for 
negotiations] sounded like ‘something an academic would propose’ because one cannot negotiate 
without some element of deceitfulness.”  Id. at 194.  In response to another question in the survey, 
“[t]wo of the attorneys indicated that they saw nothing wrong with making blatantly dishonest 
statements.  One quipped that ‘everyone knows you’re lying about your authority.’  Another 
added that puffed statements are ‘typical tools of negotiating.’”  Id. at 193. 
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. r. 3.1-3.9. 
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communicates with others to promote the lawful interests of the client, 
including through the techniques of persuasion.36 
1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others: Rule 4.1 
Rule 4.1 on “Truthfulness in Statements to Others” provides: 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; 
or 
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure 
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a 
client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.37 
The Comment to Rule 4.1 consists of two paragraphs, the first entitled 
“Misrepresentation”: 
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a 
client’s behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an 
opposing party of relevant facts.  A misrepresentation can occur if 
the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person 
that the lawyer knows is false.  Misrepresentations can also occur 
by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are 
the equivalent of affirmative false statements.  For dishonest 
conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for 
 
36. For some legal ethicists, the decision whether or not to cast the negotiating lawyer in the 
role of “advocate” is a highly significant one for the assessment of moral responsibility and 
accountability.  Murray L. Schwartz, who considers the negotiation task to be a “nonadvocate” 
role for the purpose of moral analysis, has said: 
For the advocate, two principles are posited as necessary to the effective working of 
the adversary system: a Principle of Professionalism, which obliges the lawyer within 
professional constraints to maximize the likelihood that the client will prevail, and a 
Principle of Nonaccountability, which relieves the advocate of legal, professional, and 
moral accountability for proceeding according to the first principle.   
Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 
671 (1978).  Schwartz asserts “these principles cannot be transferred automatically to the 
nonadvocate, because the absence of a third-party arbiter in the negotiating/counseling situation 
fundamentally changes the lawyer’s role.”  Id.  He concludes that negotiating lawyers, as 
“nonadvocates,” are morally obligated to “refrain from assisting the client by ‘unconscionable’ 
means or from aiming to achieve ‘unconscionable’ ends, with the term ‘unconscionable’ drawing 
its meaning largely from the substantive law of rescission, reformation, and torts.”  Id. 
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).  Rule 1.6 pertains to 
the confidentiality of “information relating to the representation of a client,” which may not be 
revealed by a lawyer “unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by [an exception 
identified in the Rule].”  Id. r. 1.6(a). 
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misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of 
representing a client, see Rule 8.4.38 
The second paragraph of the Comment takes on the task of restricting 
what counts as unethical falsehood in a statement made by a lawyer and 
does so by tightening up what counts as a “fact”: 
This Rule refers to statements of fact.  Whether a particular 
statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the 
circumstances.  Under generally accepted conventions in 
negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as 
statements of material fact.  Estimates of price or value placed on 
the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an 
acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and 
so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where 
nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.  Lawyers 
should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to 
avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.39 
The text of Rule 4.1 and its Comment is subject to criticism on several 
compelling grounds.  First, its text prohibits only lawyers’ knowingly false 
statements (i.e., lies) about “material” fact or law, in contrast to Rule 3.3, 
which prohibits knowingly false statements of any fact or law when those 
statements are made to a tribunal.40  Therefore, according to the ABA’s 
Model Rules, lawyers are allowed to lie41 to an adversary about facts or law 
 
38. Id. r. 4.1 cmt. 1.  Rule 8.4(c) provides “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”  Id. r. 8.4(c).  In a 
2006 opinion, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
expresses its view that Rule 8.4(c) “does not require a greater degree of truthfulness on the part of 
lawyers representing parties to a negotiation than does Rule 4.1.”  Amer. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on 
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439, at 2 n.2 (2006).  “Indeed,” it explains, “if Rule 
8.4 were interpreted literally as applying to any misrepresentation, regardless of the lawyer’s state 
of mind or the triviality of the false statement in question, it would render Rule 4.1 superfluous, 
including by punishing unknowing or immaterial deceptions that would not even run afoul of Rule 
4.1.”  Id.  But cf. Amer. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370, 
at 5 (1993) (citing Rule 8.4(c) as additional support for its opinion Rule 4.1 prohibits a lawyer 
from making a false statement to a judge about the lawyer’s settlement authority in a court-
assisted dispute resolution process). 
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (emphases 
added). 
40. Id. r. 3.3(a)(1).  See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR 
Proceedings: A Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 266-67 (1999) (stating 
“when it comes to negotiations, the rule prohibits only ‘material’ lies,” and “thus opens the door to 
what some refer to as ‘puffery,’ and others as lying, in negotiations.”). 
41. Sissela Bok defines a “lie” as “any intentionally deceptive message which is stated.”  
SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 13 (Vintage Books 2d ed. 
1999) (1978).  Moreover, Arthur Isak Applbaum states, “The act of intentionally inducing a belief 
in others that one believes to be false ordinarily counts as deception, whatever else it may count 
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even when making the same statement to a judge would subject the lawyer 
to disciplinary sanctions.  The reliance on the adversary/tribunal distinction 
was also explicit in a 1993 opinion from the ABA Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility (“ABA Ethics Committee”): 
While . . . a certain amount of posturing or puffery in 
settlement negotiations may be an acceptable convention between 
opposing counsel, a party’s actual bottom line or the settlement 
authority given to a lawyer is a material fact.  A deliberate 
misrepresentation or lie to a judge in pretrial negotiations would 
be improper under Rule 4.1. . . .  The proper response by a lawyer 
to improper questions from a judge is to decline to answer, not to 
lie or misrepresent.42 
Several states, including North Dakota, have adopted a variation of 
Rule 4.1 that does not include a materiality limitation,43 thereby broadening 
the expectation of truthfulness with others in representing clients to prohibit 
all knowingly false representations of fact or law.  Moreover, despite the 
language in the ABA Ethics Committee’s opinion plainly stating “a party’s 
actual bottom line or the settlement authority given to a lawyer is a material 
fact,”44 the practice of intentionally misrepresenting such facts about 
bottom lines or settlement authority is nevertheless defended by leading 
commentators on negotiation as an ethically acceptable tactic.45 
Next, although the first paragraph of Rule 4.1’s Comment notes a 
negotiating lawyer “generally has no affirmative duty to inform an 
opposing party of relevant facts,” it also cautions “[m]isrepresentations can 
. . . occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are 
 
as.”  ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC 
AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 104 (1999) (emphasis added). 
42. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370, at 5 (1993) 
(emphases added); see also DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY 
ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 54 (2008) (stating that under the Rules, “lawyers’ 
commitments to clients over truth grow stronger when only third parties, rather than tribunals, 
might be deceived”). 
43. See, e.g., N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (2015) (“In the course of representing a 
client a lawyer shall not make a statement to a third person of fact or law that the lawyer knows to 
be false.”).  North Dakota, in fact, has never included the materiality limitation in its version of 
Rule 4.1.  Id.  In 2004 and 2005, respectively, Virginia deleted “material” from Rule 4.1(a) and 
Minnesota adopted a version of Rule 4.1 similar to North Dakota’s (but omitting “to a third 
person”).  See Am. Bar Ass’n, Center for Professional Responsibility Policy Implementation 
Committee, Comparison of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct and State Variations, Rule 
4.1, at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professionalresponsibility/ 
mrpc_4_1.authcheckdam.pdf (May 6, 2014).  In 2009, when New York first adopted the Model 
Rules format, it omitted the word “material” from Rule 4.1.  Id. 
44. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370, at 5 (1993). 
45. See, e.g., infra notes 52, 108-13 and accompanying text (discussing Charles B. Craver’s 
views). 
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the equivalent of affirmative false statements.”46  So how should a 
negotiating lawyer determine which “omissions” are acceptable 
(particularly when client confidentiality concerns are prevalent) and which 
“omissions” are “the equivalent of affirmative false statements”?  With a 
vacuum of specific guidance from paragraph one,47 and given the 
affirmative support of certain deceptive negotiating tactics in paragraph 
two,48 the Comment creates a smooth glide path for reasoning that factual 
omissions having substantial deceptive effects on an adverse party are 
ethically acceptable under the Rule in many (if not most) circumstances.49 
In addition to rejecting Rule 4.1’s materiality limitation for prohibiting 
knowingly false statements, North Dakota and other states have also 
declined to adopt the second paragraph of the ABA’s Comment, with its 
permissive and accommodating attitude toward deceptive negotiating 
tactics.50  However, for the vast majority of states that have adopted this 
language, in 2006 the ABA Ethics Committee offered an opinion explaining 
its views about (1) what a “statement of material fact” is under Rule 4.1(a) 
and (2) what statements are merely “opinion” rather than assertions of 
“fact”: 
[S]tatements regarding negotiating goals or willingness to 
compromise, whether in the civil or criminal context, ordinarily 
are not considered statements of material fact within the meaning 
of the Rules.  Thus, a lawyer may downplay a client’s willingness 
to compromise, or present a client’s bargaining position without 
disclosing the client’s “bottom line” position, in an effort to reach 
a more favorable resolution.  Of the same nature are 
overstatements or understatements of the strengths or weaknesses 
of a client’s position in litigation or otherwise, or expressions of 
opinion as to the value or worth of the subject matter of the 
 
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
47. “Rule 4.1 does little to guide a lawyer during negotiation when the lawyer’s concern is 
how much, if any, confidential client information can be revealed.  In fact, Rule 4.1 says more 
about what deceit is permitted in the name of confidentiality than it says about what deceit is not 
permitted.”  Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. 
REV. 1387, 1395 (1986).   
48. “Rule 4.1 . . . has the high-minded title: ‘Truthfulness in Statements to Others.’ . . .  On 
the face of it, it seems to say that a lawyer should not lie.”  Alfini, supra note 40, at 266.  The 
limitations created by the Comment, however, instead reflect the American Bar Association has 
“unambiguously embraced ‘New York hardball’ as the official standard of practice.” Id. at 267 
(quoting Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar’s Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 445 (1988)). 
49. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.A. 
50. See N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (2015) (including the first paragraph of the 
Comment from the ABA’s Model Rule, but not the second). 
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negotiation.  Such statements generally are not considered material 
facts subject to Rule 4.1.51 
Negotiations scholar Charles B. Craver takes this already subtle parsing 
of “fact” versus “opinion” even further than does the ABA Ethics 
Committee, based on what he sees as the customary expectations lawyers 
bring to the bargaining table: 
A crucial distinction is drawn between statements of lawyer 
opinion and statements of material fact.  When attorneys merely 
expressed their opinions—for example, ‘I think the defendant had 
consumed too much alcohol’ and ‘I believe the plaintiff will 
encounter future medical difficulties’—they are not constrained by 
Rule 4.1.  Opposing counsel know that these recitations only 
concern the personal views of the speakers.  Thus, personal view 
statements are critically different from lawyer statements 
indicating that they have witnesses who can testify to these 
matters.  If representations regarding witness information [are] 
knowingly false, the misstatements would clearly violate Rule 
4.1.52 
Because most statements prefaced “I think” or “I believe” impliedly assert a 
good faith factual basis exists for having the thought or holding the belief, 
describing them as mere “opinion” and not subject to an ethical duty of 
truthfulness is an unavailing sidestep.53  Arthur Isak Applbaum refers to this 
kind of semantic game as “institutional redescription”: 
 
51. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439, at 6 (2006).  As to 
the last quoted sentence, the ABA Ethics Committee allows that “[c]onceivably, such statements 
could be viewed as violative of other provisions of the . . . Rules if made in bad faith and without 
any intention to seek a compromise.”  Id. at 6 n.18 (citing as examples Rules 4.4(a) & 3.2). 
52. Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics: How to Be Deceptive Without Being 
Dishonest/How to Be Assertive Without Being Offensive, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 713, 727 (1997) 
(emphases added). 
53. Reed Elizabeth Loder persuasively argues a lawyer’s affirmative misstatements about a 
client’s “bottom line” or the lawyer’s settlement authority cannot properly be described as mere 
“opinion” or intrinsically non-material or non-factual “value” statements: 
[One] approach to denying that the bottom line remark counts as deception is to argue 
that the remark is not a statement or assertion at all; that the first part of the definition 
of a lie, a statement believed false, is not satisfied.  The Comment [to Rule 4.1] adopts 
this tactic [such that] the lawyer whose client has authorized her to accept fifteen 
thousand dollars, may state the following to the opponent without lying: “My client 
won’t take less than twenty thousand dollars.”  According to the Comment, such 
statements are statements of value, not fact, and thus not prohibited by the language of 
the Rule. . . .  This position would be plausible if the lawyer were venturing an opinion 
of what the case was worth, such as, “we have trouble accepting your offer for a case 
worth around $20,000.”  Instead, the statement, “my client won’t accept less than 
$20,000,” is a report of the client’s minimum threshold, a fact communicated to the 
lawyer before the session.  Thus, the lawyer does assert factual information—the fact 
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Some manipulation of belief in negotiation counts in the law as 
fraud, and some counts, both in the law and in positive legal 
ethics, merely as “puffing and bluffing.”  But no institutional 
redescription can do away with the prior description of [deception 
as] “intentionally inducing a false belief,” or can block counting 
intentionally inducing false belief as deception.  Though the law 
and positive legal ethics may count certain representations as mere 
puffery or bluffery, legal rules and rules of professional practice 
cannot by themselves undo the prior description of deception.  
When puffing and bluffing is accomplished by making untrue 
statements, such as “My client will not accept anything less” when 
you have good reason to believe that this is not the case, . . . you 
are lying.  That the law has some standard of what counts as a 
“material” misrepresentation of fact is of no consequence to the 
prelegal description.  Because descriptions persist, the law does 
not determine what is or is not properly described as a lie.54 
It is ultimately self-serving for the legal profession to justify such 
institutional redescription on the ground that these forms of deception are 
consistent with “generally accepted conventions of negotiation.”  Moreover, 
as a general matter, the Rules do not present themselves as simply codifying 
extrinsic “conventions” of the practice of law, but rather as themselves 
establishing the normative standards for professionally responsible 
conduct.55 
 
that the client made a statement about a minimally acceptable figure—and it is 
disingenuous to categorize the statement as one of opinion or value.   
Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
45, 73-74 (1994) (footnotes omitted).  The relevant ABA Ethics Committee opinions contain more 
support for Loder’s view on this issue than Craver’s.  A 1993 opinion calls a lawyer’s 
representations about client settlement authority (when a judge is involved in the dispute 
resolution process) statements of “material fact,” (see supra notes 38, 42-44, and accompanying 
text), and a 2006 opinion seeks carefully to limit the permissible scope of facts relating to client 
settlement authority about which a lawyer may make false statements.  See supra notes 38, 51, and 
accompanying text.  See generally MARKOVITS, supra note 42, at 274 n.74 (“The point of the 
lawyer’s claim about her client’s settlement reservation price is for the other side to accept, and 
act on, its truth, and the Comment therefore cannot wish the lie away by claiming that it is not 
factual or material.”). 
54. APPLBAUM, supra note 41, at 105.  Applbaum insightfully asks if “lies about most 
opinions, evaluations, and future intentions do not count” as material, “why . . .does anyone waste 
breath making such statements?”  Id. at 105-06. 
55. See Hogan, supra note 31, at 730 (in reference to Rule 4.1 and Comment [2], noting that 
“[s]cholars have additionally identified the obvious problem of who is it that decides what 
‘generally accepted conventions’ are and why this standard is applicable in this rule but not in 
other areas of the Model Rules” (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality and Professional 
Responsibility in Negotiation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 119, 
119-154 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002))).   
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James J. Alfini has proposed revisions to Rule 4.1 and the second 
paragraph to its Comment to increase the expectations of truthfulness in 
alternative dispute resolution proceedings that are not supervised by a 
tribunal.  Specifically, he recommends deleting the materiality limitation 
from the text of Rule 4.1(a); inserting a new Rule 4.1(b) prohibiting a 
lawyer from “assist[ing] the client in reaching a settlement agreement that is 
based on reliance upon a false statement of fact made by the lawyer’s 
client”; and replacing the second paragraph of the Comment with language 
stating a lawyer should “inform the client of the lawyer’s duty to be truthful 
and the lawyer’s inability to assist the client in reaching a settlement 
agreement that is procured in whole or in part as a result of a false statement 
of material fact or law made by the client.”56  Alfini makes excellent 
recommendations,57 which should be expanded to include all lawyer 
negotiations.  State and local bar associations should also consider adopting 
standards for “good faith” negotiation practice similar to those which have 
existed in the District of Columbia since 1996, including the principle that 
lawyers “will not knowingly misrepresent or mischaracterize facts or 
authorities or affirmatively mislead another party or its counsel in 
negotiations.”58 
2. Dealing with Unrepresented Persons: Rule 4.3 
For most lawyers, the vast majority of their negotiations occur with 
opposing counsel representing the adverse party.  But what about 
negotiations with unrepresented adverse parties?  Should Rule 4.1, 
 
56. Alfini, supra note 40, at 270-71. 
57. If considered for adoption by the ABA, the word “material” in the proposed second 
paragraph of the Comment (as quoted above) should be stricken for substantive consistency, as 
Alfini wisely suggests this word should be omitted from the Rule because it “open[s] the door to 
lying.”  See id. at 269-70. 
58. See D.C. BAR VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OF CIVILITY (adopted by the D.C. Bar Board of 
Governors, June 18, 1996; amended March 11, 1997), cited in Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of 
Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 
REGULATION 140 n.34 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of 
Adversarial Ethics] as an example of a state bar seeking “to enact some substantive rules of ‘good 
faith and fair dealing’ representations in business transactions and other negotiations.”  These 
standards also express professional expectations of good faith and fair dealing to “honor all 
understandings with, and commitments . . . made to, other attorneys,” to “stand by proposals we 
have made in negotiations unless newly received information or unforeseen circumstances provide 
a good faith basis for rescinding them,” and to “encourage . . . clients to conduct themselves in 
accordance with this principle.”  Id.  They state that lawyers “will not make changes to written 
documents under negotiation in a manner calculated to cause the opposing party or counsel to 
overlook or fail to appreciate the changes” and “will clearly and accurately identify for other 
counsel and parties all changes that we have made in documents submitted to us for review.”  Id.  
Finally, they provide that “[i]n memorializing oral agreements the parties have reached, we will 
do so without making changes in substance and will strive in good faith to state the oral 
understandings accurately and completely,” including with letters of intent.  Id. 
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including the permissive Comment language about what counts as “fact” 
and what are described as “generally accepted conventions of negotiation,” 
apply with equal force in those circumstances?  And do other Rules provide 
further limitations or otherwise help us to understand the ethical duties of a 
negotiating lawyer?  Although several Rules have implications in the 
negotiation context,59 the most important is Rule 4.3 on “Dealing with 
Unrepresented Person,” which provides: 
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not 
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the 
lawyer is disinterested.  When the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the 
lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable 
efforts to correct the misunderstanding.  The lawyer shall not give 
legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to 
secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable 
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.60 
Concerning negotiations with unrepresented persons, the Comment to Rule 
4.3 offers the following explanation, clarifications, and reassurances: 
Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on 
the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as 
well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur.  
This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of 
a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person.  
So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an 
adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may 
inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer’s client will 
enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that 
require the person’s signature and explain the lawyer’s own view 
of the meaning of the document or the lawyer’s view of the 
underlying legal obligations.61 
Rule 4.3 acknowledges the risk that in representing a client, a lawyer 
may overreach and take improper advantage of an unrepresented person.62  
 
59. For example, Rules 3.2 (Expediting Litigation) and 4.4(a) (Respect for Rights of Third 
Persons) have some implications for the use of negotiation (and certain tactics in the course of 
negotiation) for the purpose of delay (Rule 3.2) or to “embarrass, delay, or burden” the adverse 
party (Rule 4.4(a)).  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2, 4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).  
60. Id. r. 4.3. 
61. Id. r. 4.3, cmt. 2 (emphases added). 
62. See id. (referring to “the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented 
person’s interests”). 
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An awareness of this ethical risk is implicit in its Comment language 
touching on negotiation.  In fact, when viewed side-by-side with Rule 4.1’s 
Comment—with its duty-narrowing text and exculpatory tone―Rule 4.3’s 
Comment virtually endorses the virtues of lawyer straight-talk.  It speaks 
with an objective perspective about “the terms” of an agreement or 
settlement and about “the lawyer’s view” (not necessarily the lawyer’s 
subjective and personal one, but one formed reasonably and in objective 
good faith)63 of what legal rights and obligations actually exist and what 
interpretations of relevant materials should be applied.64 
In a comment to its provision on dealing with “a non-client who is not 
represented by a lawyer,”65 the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers (“Restatement”) offers two distinct 
reasons for embracing enhanced protections for unrepresented persons in 
negotiation: 
Active negotiation by a lawyer with unrepresented non[-]clients is 
appropriate in the course of representing a client. . . .  Lawyers 
should in any event be trustworthy.  Moreover, by education, 
training, and practice, lawyers generally possess knowledge and 
skills not possessed by non[-]lawyers.  Consequently, a lawyer 
may be in a superior negotiating position when dealing with an 
unrepresented non[-]client, who therefore should be given legal 
protection against overreaching by a lawyer.66 
 
63. Cf. id. r. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an 
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which 
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”).  An 
objective test is used in determining whether a lawyer has complied with Rule 3.1’s requirements 
of non-frivolousness and good faith.  See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL 
ETHICS: LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 3.1-1 (2015-2016 ed.), 
Westlaw (under Rule 3.1, “the duty of a lawyer not to bring frivolous cases and arguments does 
not rest on whether the client has a subjective intent to harass or injure a third person”; instead, 
unlike DR 7-102(A)(1) of Model Code of Professional Responsibility, “the test in Rule 3.1 is an 
objective test”).  I recommend the lawyers employ a similarly objective normative standard for 
good faith and honest dealing in negotiations.  See infra Part V. 
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3, cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).  
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
The Restatement provides “the lawyer may not mislead the non[-]client, to the prejudice of the 
non[-]client, concerning the identity and interests of the person the lawyer represents” and “must 
make reasonable efforts to correct misunderstanding [about the lawyer’s role, known or 
reasonably known] when failure to do so would materially prejudice the non[-]client.”  Id. 
66. Id. § 103, cmt. B.  It is noteworthy that in support of “legal protection against 
overreaching by a lawyer,” this comment points to the principle of contract law creating liability 
where there is “justifiable reliance on assertion of opinion, because of asserting person’s special 
skill, judgment, or objectivity.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 169(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)); see also Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of 
Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 79, 138 (1997) (urging states to adopt rules detailing “the behavior that is prohibited 
when an attorney deals with an unrepresented opponent, including statements made in the course 
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Thus, the Restatement identifies trustworthiness as a lawyerly virtue in 
dealing with an unrepresented person, and one that has ethical significance 
along with the general deterrence objective against overreaching conduct by 
lawyers.  The virtue of trustworthiness stands out as an independently 
valuable element of professional character the lawyer must maintain even 
when its compromise would benefit the client in a negotiation. 
When viewing Rule 4.3 together with the Restatement, it is reasonable 
to conclude the positive law of legal ethics already requires a higher 
standard of truthfulness for lawyers when negotiating with unrepresented 
persons than with opposing counsel.67  Nevertheless, in light of the subtlety 
with which this principle is articulated, there is merit to the idea of 
codifying it with greater force and clarity.  Some, such as Victoria L. 
Haneman, would go even further in forging increased protections for 
unrepresented persons, in the form of a rule creating a duty of fairness that 
encompasses not only a lawyer’s good faith and fair dealing but also the 
lawyer’s avoidance of substantively unfair outcomes.68  Regardless of 
whether the opposing party is represented by counsel, significant doctrinal 
and practical reasons exist for not imposing on lawyers a duty to ensure the 
substantive fairness of negotiations.69  That said, Haneman’s proposal is 
 
of negotiations,” and which “should err on the side of protecting the unrepresented party, even at 
the risk of impeding the lawyer’s ability to obtain a quick settlement.”). 
67. Cf. Dahl, supra note 32, at 193 (based on interviews with fourteen lawyers from a variety 
of law practice areas, finding “[a] bare majority of the lawyers believed that attorneys should be 
held to a higher standard when negotiating with unrepresented parties”). 
68. The text of Haneman’s proposed rule reads: 
A lawyer appearing against an unrepresented opponent shall not unfairly exploit 
his opponent’s ignorance of the law or the practices of the tribunal, nor take advantage 
of the opponent’s misinformation, ignorance or inexperience.  In dealing with an 
unrepresented party, a lawyer must not take advantage of economic disparities to 
harass the unrepresented party or bring about unjust results.  Upon learning that a 
party is appearing pro se, a lawyer shall not continue litigation that is inconsistent with 
applicable law.  A lawyer not having such discretionary power who believes there is 
lack of merit in a controversy submitted to him should so advise his superiors and 
recommend the avoidance of unfair litigation. 
Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 MO. L. REV. 
707, 739 (2008).   
69. See discussion infra Parts V.B and V.C.  In an influential 1975 article supporting a duty 
of fairness in negotiation that would embrace substantive considerations as well as fair processes, 
Judge Alvin B. Rubin nevertheless recognizes the practical challenges such standards would face 
in implementation:  
Since bona fides and truthfulness do not inevitably lead to fairness in 
negotiations, an entirely truthful lawyer might be able to make an unconscionable deal 
when negotiating with a government agency, or a layman or another attorney who is 
representing his own client.  Few lawyers would presently deny themselves and their 
clients the privilege of driving a hard bargain against any of these adversaries [even] 
though the opponent’s ability to negotiate effectively in his own interest may not be 
equal to that of the lawyer in question. 
          
266 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:247 
based on a moral principle of “ordinary language”—that is, “the normative 
proposition that professionals must respect and not exploit the ‘layperson 
intuition’ of the layperson opponent”―which has considerable force when 
applied to the expectations for lawyer truthfulness in negotiations with 
unrepresented persons.70  In that context, “[a] non-attorney will rely upon 
the reasonable notion that justice does not run contrary to basic precepts of 
common sense, and that the courts will not permit their officers to represent 
what they know is a falsehood.”71  Stated differently, as cynical as many 
members of the public may be about the honesty of members of the bar, 
they should be presumed to expect the courts’ rules do not authorize 
lawyers to lie to them in order to gain an advantage for their clients.  More 
importantly, the Rules should be written in such a way as to make the 
public’s morally intuitive presumption also plainly correct as a matter of 
law. 
B. CIVIL LIABILITY 
In addition to navigating the somewhat ambiguous ethical boundaries 
created by the professional conduct rules, negotiating lawyers must also be 
concerned with the common law civil liability principles applicable to these 
processes and enforceable against lawyers, their clients, or both.  This 
article will briefly sketch some of these key principles, with a focus on civil 
liabilities based on failures to be truthful. 
1. Lawyers 
In a recent comprehensive study of lawyers’ professional 
responsibilities and civil liabilities in negotiations, Douglas R. Richmond 
examines how “[l]awyers’ dishonesty in negotiations . . . exposes them to 
potential civil liability for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or aiding and 
abetting a client’s fraud or breach of fiduciary duty.”72  Lawyers might 
assume that statements of fact or law that comply with Rule 4.1 could not 
lead to the imposition of civil liability on their part; but, as Richmond 
points out, this is not necessarily true: 
[L]awyers’ duty of truthfulness under Rule 4.1(a) is not perfectly 
congruent with potential civil liability for misrepresentation.  
 
Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers’ Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 590 (1975) 
(emphasis added). 
70. Haneman, supra note 68, at 740-41. 
71. Id. at 741 (emphasis added). 
72. Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities and Liabilities in 
Negotiations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 249, 290 (2009). 
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Many statements that are not treated as statements of material fact 
as a matter of professional responsibility, but which are instead 
considered to be “puffery” or “posturing,” are not similarly 
exempted under contract and tort law.  As a matter of tort and 
contract law, the central question with respect to such statements is 
more commonly one of reasonable reliance.73 
He elaborates that in civil lawsuits against lawyers, defending 
“misstatements in negotiations on the basis of puffery is of limited utility, 
because whether a statement is or is not actionable depends on its context, 
the lawyer’s actual knowledge, and the person to whom it is made.”74  For 
example, in a given situation, “a lawyer’s seeming puffery, such as the 
statement that a parcel of land ‘is a lot of property for the money,’ may be 
actionable fraud.”75  But, says Richmond, “[t]hat same statement would be 
unlikely to expose a lawyer to professional discipline under Rule 4.1(a)” 
based on the permissive language in its Comment.76  He helpfully 
summarizes his practical advice for lawyers with some basic precepts and 
examples: 
In a nutshell, if lawyers speak on material issues of fact or law, 
they must do so honestly.  Whether a particular statement of fact or 
law is material generally requires case-specific inquiry, although 
the existence and amount of insurance coverage are always 
material facts.  Lawyers’ duty of honesty clearly includes a duty to 
inform an opponent of a client’s death or of clearly applicable 
insurance.  Lawyers’ duty of honesty also includes a duty to 
inform opposing parties of relevant facts (1) where a writing does 
not reflect the parties’ agreement; (2) when they know that an 
opponent holds a mistaken belief that, if uncorrected, will 
substantially deprive the opponent of the benefit of its bargain, or 
will materially lessen that benefit; or (3) in the incredibly rare 
situation where they owe the opponent a fiduciary duty.77 
 
73. Id. at 296 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98, cmt. 
c Rptrs. Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000)). 
74. Id. (citing Jeska v. Mulhall, 693 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)). 
75. Id. (quoting lawyer in Jeska, 693 P.2d at 1337). 
76. Id. at 296-97.  Richmond adds that the Comment to Rule 4.1 “prudently cautions lawyers 
to ‘be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious 
misrepresentation.’” Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR. 
ASS’N 2008)). 
77. Id. at 297. 
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2. Clients 
In addition to the potential civil liability lawyers face relating to 
information communicated or withheld in connection with negotiations, 
they must also consider the possible civil liability and other legal 
consequences to which their clients may be exposed.  In an article focusing 
primarily on the duty to disclose material facts, Nathan M. Crystal explains 
that a lawyer’s failure to comply with this duty may result in rescission of 
the client’s contract, whether business transaction or settlement 
agreement.78  Thus, even though the Comment to Rule 4.1 provides that a 
lawyer “generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of 
relevant facts,”79 under some circumstances “lawyers have a duty to 
disclose information to the opposing side.”80  Crystal points to Judge Alvin 
B. Rubin’s much-discussed 1975 article on negotiation ethics and its stated 
principle that “if the client has an obligation to disclose information in 
connection with contract or settlement negotiations, lawyers have a parallel 
duty.”81  As examples, Crystal cites decisions in which courts ordered 
rescission of contracts “because plaintiff’s counsel failed to reveal the death 
of the client,”82 because the lawyer failed “to disclose basic facts when the 
lawyer [knew] that the other side [was] entering into an agreement based on 
a mistake about those facts,”83 or because of “[n]ondisclosure of significant 
mathematical errors.”84 
When a duty to disclose exists and the lawyer violates this duty by 
withholding the facts subject to disclosure, and while acting with the 
client’s actual or apparent authority, the client may also be found civilly 
liable for fraud in the transaction.85  Under what circumstances will such 
 
78. See Nathan M. Crystal, The Lawyer’s Duty to Disclose Material Facts in Contract or 
Settlement Negotiations, 87 KY. L.J. 1055, 1067 (1998-1999). 
79. Id. at 1071-72 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2015)). 
80. Id. at 1069.  Crystal notes that “Professor James [J.] White[,] in his influential article on 
negotiations[,] expressed his support (with some cautionary statements) for a proposed model rule 
of professional conduct that would have required lawyers to disclose information necessary to 
correct a manifest misapprehension of fact or law resulting from a previous representation made 
by the lawyer or known by the lawyer to have been made by the client.”  Id. at 1069 n.78 (citing 
White, Machiavelli and the Bar, supra note 29, at 935). 
81. Id. at 1068 (citing Rubin, supra note 69, at 589). 
82. Id. at 1069 (citing Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 
507 (E.D. Mich. 1983)). 
83. Id. at 1070 (citing Hamilton v. Harper, 404 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1991)). 
84. Id. at 1073 (citing Stare v. Tate, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Ct. App. 1971)). 
85. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(addressing a principal’s direct and vicarious liability to a third party harmed by an agent’s 
conduct). 
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non-disclosure be considered “the equivalent of misrepresentation”?86  
Crystal correctly describes this question as addressing “[t]he most difficult 
aspect of the duty to disclose,” because “the case law . . . seems to lack any 
unifying principles.”87  He finds some clarity on this challenging but very 
important question by reviewing the case law against the backdrop of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.88  From this source he identifies four 
categories of disclosure: “(1) corrective disclosure; (2) disclosure of known 
mistakes in a writing; (3) fiduciary disclosure; and (4) disclosure of 
mistakes about basic facts when required by good faith.”89  Discussing the 
fourth category, Crystal explains that a lawyer’s failure to correct mistakes 
about basic facts does not create liability unless it “violate[s] a standard of 
good faith and fair dealing.”90  That said: 
Some lawyers will argue that there is no professional agreement or 
consensus on the meaning of good faith and fair dealing in 
negotiations, and accordingly, this standard cannot be a basis for 
imposing disclosure obligations on lawyers.  This argument should 
be rejected for several reasons.  First, the fact that lawyers may 
disagree . . . is not an argument against the existence of such an 
obligation. . . .  Second, lawyers are subject to the law, and . . . 
general contract and tort law recognize a duty to disclose 
information when required by good faith and fair dealing.  Finally, 
lawyers should consider the consequences of the absence of a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in connection with contract and 
settlement negotiations.  Do lawyers want to have a profession in 
which they do not have a right to expect good faith and fair 
dealing from their fellow professionals?  Are lawyers willing to 
 
86. Crystal, supra note 78, at 1076. 
87. Id. 
 88. Section 161 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS provides: 
A person’s non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion 
that the fact does not exist in the following cases only: (a) where he knows that 
disclosure of the fact is necessary to prevent some previous assertion from being a 
misrepresentation or from being fraudulent or material. (b) where he knows that 
disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic 
assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact 
amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards 
of fair dealing. (c) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake 
of the other party as to the contents or effect of a writing, evidencing or embodying an 
agreement in whole or in part. [and] (d) where the other person is entitled to know the 
fact because of a relation of trust and confidence between them.  
Crystal, supra note 78, at 1076-77 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981)). 
89. Id. at 1077 (citing also, regarding fiduciary nondisclosure, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 551 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
90. Id. at 1081. 
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state publicly that the profession’s values do not include good faith 
and fair dealing when ordinary business people must live by such 
an obligation?91 
The answer to these emphasized questions should be an emphatic 
“No.”  Nevertheless, as Machiavelli’s precepts continue to cast their dim 
gray shadow over the customs and practices of the legal profession, there is 
a moral risk that the fleeting triumphs for lawyers who break faith with their 
fellow professionals or unrepresented members of the public will tempt 
others to follow in their footsteps.  This temptation should be resisted, and 
this article will propose a path for how individual lawyers and their 
colleagues in the bar may instead foster a culture of faith keeping in their 
communities of practice. 
IV. CONCEPTS OF RISK IN LAWYER NEGOTIATION 
Negotiation has been defined as “any situation in which two or more 
parties are engaged in communications, the aim of which is agreement on 
terms affecting an exchange, or a distribution of benefits, burden, roles, or 
responsibilities.”92  A lawyer’s practice of negotiation involves the 
assessment and confrontation of various kinds of risks.  The law of lawyer 
negotiation defines the boundaries for the exposure of lawyer and client to 
“legal risks,” consisting of disciplinary action against the lawyer for 
violating professional conduct rules and potential civil liability (for lawyer 
or client).  This article will now define and discuss two additional concepts 
of risk in lawyer negotiation―“informational risks” and “moral 
risks”―and how a lawyer’s choices about how to resolve them may impact 
the lawyer, the client, and the community. 
A. INFORMATIONAL RISKS: NEGOTIATION AS A GAME 
In all practical respects, negotiating lawyers must assess and confront 
“informational risk.”  This encompasses uncertainties about points of fact or 
law flowing from the past to the present, as well as future contingencies 
impacting the value of the outcome, either where there is an agreed-upon 
resolution or, instead, a decision not to reach agreement.93  Yet as Reed 
 
91. Id. (emphasis added). 
92. Peter C. Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in 
Practical Ethics, in CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS 
FOR NEGOTIATORS 108, 111 (2004). 
93. See Loder, supra note 53, at 96.  Emphasizing that “[n]egotiations typically occur in a 
backdrop of ambiguity and uncertainty,” Loder further explains that “[d]ifficulties in predicting 
how a decision-maker will perceive and resolve the case compound the uncertainties of law.”  Id.  
Moreover, “[h]uman uncertainties also cloud the process because the lawyer cannot predict 
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Elizabeth Loder has said, even in the midst of these many uncertainties, the 
negotiation process still has “significant shape,” as “[a] successful 
negotiator identifies uncertainties but also outside boundaries.”94  She 
elaborates about how this process unfolds: 
A reasonable settlement outcome falls within [the] bounded range 
of possibilities.  Those contours define the interactive process of 
compromise.  Effective negotiators offer strong reasons for each 
demand and concession.  These reasons emerge directly from the 
complex interaction between perceived possibilities and 
constraints.  This looming tension between uncertainty and 
confidence characterizes the epistemological stance of the artful 
negotiator. 
The tension exists whether or not the parties have treated each 
other with candor.  It is inherent in the concept of legal truth.95 
Given the pressure of resolving this informational risk, which will take 
different forms and be in different proportions in any given negotiations,96 
how should a lawyer develop the best strategy and approach to abide by the 
client’s objectives for the process?  In the ample literature on negotiation 
tactics and ethics, it is fairly common to see negotiation described as a 
“game,” and, upon such description, to find the authors drawing analogies 
to the generally accepted moral standards for those who play these games.97  
In such comparisons, poker seems to be the most popular choice.  As James 
J. White has said, “Like the poker player, a negotiator hopes that his 
opponent will overestimate the value of his hand.  Like the poker player, in 
 
personal responses to unfolding events.  Participants in a negotiation cannot ‘know’ what the 
result should be.”  Id.  In discussing the role of lawyers in dispute resolution, Daniel Markovits 
observes “both ethical theory and empirical research suggest that disputants have a natural ethical 
inclination in favor of resolving disputes through reasonable reciprocal concessions.”  Daniel 
Markovits, Lawyerly Fidelity, in LOYALTY 55, 89 (Sanford Levinson et al. eds., 2013) (footnotes 
omitted).  “[M]ost clients,” however, “being inexperienced in the disputes in which they are 
engaged, are uncertain which concessions are in fact reasonable.  Lawyers have experience and 
expertise that clients do not and can therefore help to resolve this uncertainty.”  Id. 
94. Loder, supra note 53, at 96. 
95. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
96. For example, the facts may be well-known, but the law unsettled; or the present facts and 
law may be clear, but the future contingencies less so. 
97. See, e.g., White, Machiavelli and the Bar, supra note 29, at 929 (asserting that in 
deciding what duty a negotiating lawyer has to be honest or candid, “[t]here is no general principle 
waiting somewhere to be discovered”; instead, “mostly we are . . . hunting for the rules of the 
game as the game is played in that particular circumstance”); Jonathan R. Cohen, When People 
Are the Means: Negotiating With Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 775 (2001) (challenging 
those who justify lawyers’ use of deception in negotiation on the grounds that such deceit is a 
matter of “Custom – ‘That’s Just How the Game of Negotiation is Played.  It’s a No-Holds-Barred 
Game Where Each Side Just Tries to Get the Best Deal It Can.’”). 
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a variety of ways he must facilitate his opponent’s inaccurate assessment.”98  
Barry R. Temkin contends “[t]he more aggressive negotiators, including the 
most ethically aggressive, often obtain optimal results for their clients and 
develop successful practices.  The best bluffers frequently clean up at the 
poker table.”99  Scott R. Peppet acknowledges that “as a public relations 
matter, it would be easier on the bar to completely forbid all lying.”100  
Nevertheless, as a more realistic matter of “moral pluralism” and as 
contemplated by Rule 4.1’s Comment, Peppet insists that “[j]ust as bluffing 
is permitted in poker, so too should it be permitted in legal negotiations.”101 
But does conceiving of negotiation as a “game” lawyers play to resolve 
informational risk in favor of their clients tell us anything meaningful 
(logically or otherwise) about the morality of  deceptions committed by 
lawyers?102  Even if the rules or generally accepted customs in some games 
permit their players to engage in deception, calling negotiation a game does 
not necessarily mean deception should either be allowed by its rules or 
considered to be moral conduct by its participants.103  Yet the “rules of the 
 
98. White, Machiavelli and the Bar, supra note 29, at 927.  
99. Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: Should 
There Be a Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 183 (2004).  
100. Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of 
the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 510 
(2005). 
101. Id. at 511.   
102. See APPLBAUM, supra note 41, at 113-20 (arguing negotiation does not require or 
legitimize deception, and challenging the “rules of the game” defense for such deception).  As 
Howard Raiffa defines it, “Game theory studies how rational actors ought to behave when their 
separate choices interact to produce payoffs to each player.”  HOWARD RAIFFA, NEGOTIATION 
ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING (2002).  When 
applied to negotiation analysis, Raiffa’s “ought” serves the merely instrumentalist goal of 
maximizing returns:  
Many people, when discussing the desirability of lying in a bargaining situation, say 
something like this: “I wouldn’t like to lie against someone who is honest; that would 
make me the bad guy.  But I don’t want to be taken advantage of either, so I would lie 
if I thought the other was lying.”  Thus the usual rule is, “lie if you think they are 
lying.”  The equilibrium analysis shows that this intuitive notion is completely 
wrong—at least from the point of view of maximizing the return from any one 
particular negotiation.  The more honest the other party is, the less risk there is of 
destroying a possible deal by misrepresentation.  And the more room there is to grab 
the surplus by misrepresenting.  The more honest they are, the more it pays you to lie.  
Conversely, the more dishonest they are, the greater the risk of reaching no agreement.  
The payoffs to lying go down, and the payoff to honesty goes up.  Apparently, when 
you are dealing with a crook, the smart thing is to be honest. 
Id. at 126 (emphasis added). 
103. Arthur Isak Applbaum examines “smaller social games,” such as poker and football, 
and discusses why they are distinguishable in morally significant ways from the “larger social 
games,” such as lawyer negotiation: 
In the case of smaller social games . . . one is more likely to think that game 
permission does create moral permission.  For example, deception and violence are 
presumptive moral wrongs, but the rules of the game of poker permit deception, and 
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game” excuse for deceiving the opponent in negotiation is widespread in 
the literature on this subject.  According to Temkin, “Lawyers posture, 
threaten, bluff, wheedle, obscure, misdirect, and, often, outright mislead 
adversaries in order to obtain advantage for their clients,” and “the ability to 
mislead and misdirect an adversary is generally considered a virtue among 
lawyers.”104  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. defines the ethical boundaries of 
truthfulness in negotiation in terms of what kinds of deception are 
“productive” and which are not; he observes that “[p]roductive negotiation 
requires a combination of openness about matters to be conceded and 
secrecy about one’s reserve position, a game of hide and seek within those 
limits.”105  Hazard opines that “[p]ositively misleading statements are 
destructive because they frustrate achieving a positive result—‘getting to 
“yes”’ in the jargon of negotiation”; thus, “[c]are in expression and 
wariness in attention are . . . required in playing the game.”106  Peter C. 
 
the rules of boxing, football, and hockey permit violence.  It is widely believed that 
lying in poker and tackling in football are morally permissible, and widely believed 
that this is so because the rules of the games of poker and football permit such actions.  
Similarly, it is widely believed that the permissive rules of professional games such as 
lawyering . . . generate moral permissions to engage in deceptive and coercive tactics 
that, if not for their game permissibility, would be morally wrong. 
APPLBAUM, supra note 41, at 114. 
Unlike poker, consent to the rules of larger social games played by . . . lawyers . . 
. may be absent or defective.  First, most public and professional games profoundly 
affect those who are not players. . . .  Second, not all players are knowledgeable about 
the rules of the game. . . .  Third, even when players are knowledgeable, they may face 
exit barriers or their alternatives may be so poor that their continued participation in an 
adversary game cannot be assumed fully voluntary.  
. . . . 
. . . [I]f the rules of the game require consent for their legitimation, then consent 
to a transaction does not necessarily legitimate the rules under which the transaction 
has occurred.   
Id. at 116-17. 
104. Temkin, supra note 99, at 182-83 (emphasis added). 
105. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Practice and the Limits of Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS IN 
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 75, 89 (Deborah L. Rhode 
ed., 2000).   
106. Id.  Gerald B. Wetlaufer, with considerable regret, expresses a similar view about the 
effectiveness and prevalence of lying in lawyer negotiation: 
Effectiveness in negotiations is central to the business of lawyering and a 
willingness to lie is central to one’s effectiveness in negotiations.  Within a wide range 
of circumstances, well-told lies are highly effective.  Moreover, the temptation to lie is 
great not just because lies are effective, but also because the world in which most of us 
live is one that honors instrumental effectiveness above all other things.  Most lawyers 
are paid not for their virtues but for the results they produce. . . .  Accordingly, and 
regrettably, lying is not the province of a few “unethical lawyers” who operate on the 
margins of the profession.  It is a permanent feature of advocacy and thus of almost 
the entire province of law.   
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1272 (1990); cf. 
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 152 
(1993) (stating that “an advocate will want to engross as much of th[e] surplus [available in 
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Reilly asserts that lawyers “in negotiation must learn how to carefully and 
purposefully implement strategies and behaviors to defend themselves 
against those who lie and deceive―no matter the reasons prompting it.”107 
Finally, Charles B. Craver insists that active deception is ubiquitous in 
lawyer negotiation.108  Craver’s advice to lawyers focuses on what he 
considers “useful,” and he decries as “pious” and “hypocritical” those who 
regard truthfulness as an overriding moral concern in the process.109  If the 
category of communication (e.g., “puffing,” “embellishment,” or 
responding to questions about “authorized limits or minimum settlement 
objectives”) is one in which the other participants should reasonably expect 
“mendacity,” “the usual dissembling,” or “outright prevarication,” Craver 
would reluctantly permit a lawyer to lie for the client’s advantage.110  He 
dismisses concerns that deceptive negotiating tactics tend to materially 
damage “risk-averse” parties in favor of “risk-tolerant” parties in a way that 
is economically inefficient: 
While this observation is undoubtedly true, it is unlikely to 
discourage the pervasive use of ethically permissible tactics 
designed to deceive risk-averse opponents into believing they must 
accept less beneficial terms than they need actually accept.  It is 
thus unproductive to discuss a utopian negotiation world in which 
 
negotiation] as he can for his own client’s benefit, using cajolery, threats, and bluffing to do so,” 
but also allowing that “the use of these techniques has limits, for no third party will agree to terms 
from which he does not profit”). 
107. Reilly, supra note 29, at 482.  He offers “prescriptive advice . . .  for minimizing one’s 
risk of being exploited in a negotiation should other parties lie,” which is “undergirded by the 
notion . . . that information exchange (or lack thereof) plays a pivotal role in all negotiations.”  Id. 
at 482-83.  He opines “the various strategies and behaviors influencing whether, when, and how 
information is obtained and/or exchanged are extremely important in the process of defending 
oneself (or one’s client) against lying and deception.”  Id. at 483. 
108. Craver recounts his teaching experiences: “I frequently surprise law students by telling 
them that while I have rarely participated in legal negotiations in which both participants did not 
lie, I have encountered few dishonest practitioners.”  CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL 
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT § 17.01[2], at 592 (5th ed. 2005).  He contends “the fundamental 
question is not whether legal negotiators may lie, but when and about what they may permissibly 
dissemble.  Students initially find it difficult to accept the notion that disingenuous ‘puffing’ and 
deliberate mendacity do not always constitute reprehensible conduct.”  Id.  Contra to Craver, this 
article respectfully submits that this kind of acculturation of law students and new lawyers to 
regard lying as acceptable (or even laudable) conduct in negotiation is detrimental not only to the 
students as future lawyers, but also to their clients and communities.  See discussion infra Part IV.   
109. CRAVER, supra note 108, § 17.01[2], at 592. 
110. Id.  Craver asserts “[a]lmost all professional bargainers . . . believe that advocates who 
ask these questions [about authorized limits or settlement objectives] have no right to expect 
forthright replies,” because “[t]he inquiries pertain to confidential lawyer-client matters that 
concern excluded client values or settlement intentions.”  Id.  Therefore, “most attorneys” say 
“that questions relating to these areas need not be candidly answered during the negotiation 
process.”  Id.  There is, however, a substantial difference between declining to candidly answer 
such questions and making knowingly false statements of fact in response to them.  See discussion 
infra Part V.A. 
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complete disclosure is the norm.  The real question concerns the 
types of deceptive tactics that may ethically be employed to 
enhance bargaining interests.  Attorneys who believe that no 
prevarication is ever proper during bargaining place themselves 
and their clients at a disadvantage.  They permit their less candid 
opponents to obtain settlements that transcend the terms to which 
they are objectively entitled.111 
Craver concedes “[l]awyers must remember that they have to live with their 
own consciences, and not those of their clients or their partners,” and 
therefore “must employ tactics they are comfortable using even in those 
situations in which other people encourage them to employ less reputable 
behavior.”112  Such lawyers, he says, will not only “experience personal 
discomfort, but they will also fail to achieve their intended objective due to 
the fact they will not appear credible when using those tactics.”113  Thus, 
even when acknowledging the role of the lawyer’s conscience, Craver 
offers an outcome-driven justification for the lawyer to assuage it. 
These contemporary defenses of deceptive negotiation tactics carry 
within them the long-traveled yet clear and distinct sounds of Machiavellian 
moral philosophy.  Craver’s advice to lawyers is resonant with 
Machiavelli’s advice in The Prince: 
For a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards 
must come to ruin among so many who are not good.  Hence it is 
necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to 
be able not to be good, and to use this and not use it according to 
necessity.114 
A prudent lord, therefore, cannot observe faith, nor should he, 
when such observance turns against him, and the causes that made 
him promise have been eliminated.  And if all men were good, this 
 
111. CRAVER, supra note 108, § 17.01[2], at 594 (emphases added).  Craver poses “complete 
disclosure” as the only viable alternative to permitting lawyers to engage in active deception 
through the careful use of false or misleading statements.  On the contrary, viable alternative 
strategies that do not involve lies or other forms of deception do exist for exchanging information 
and for responding to inquiries made by other participants in a negotiation (even inappropriately 
intrusive ones).  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
112. CRAVER, supra note 108, § 17.04, at 621. 
113. Id. 
114. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 61; cf. White, Machiavelli and the Bar, supra note 29, 
at 927 (“[I]f the low probability of punishment means that many lawyers will violate the standard, 
the standard becomes even more difficult for the honest lawyer to follow, for by doing so he may 
be forfeiting a significant advantage for his client to others who do not follow the rules.”); 
Wetlaufer, supra note 106, at 1230 (“Lying offers significant distributive advantages to the liar 
and the incentive to lie is therefore great.  Moreover, because we understand that our adversary is 
under the same incentive to lie, we are highly attentive to the possibility that we are being conned 
and are predisposed to assume the worst.”).   
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teaching would not be good; but because they are wicked and do 
not observe faith with you, you also do not have to observe it with 
them.  Nor does a prince ever lack legitimate causes to color his 
failure to observe faith.115 
In Temkin’s and Hazard’s extolling the virtues of astuteness and cunning in 
lawyers who carefully mislead their adversaries in negotiation through 
deceptive tactics, one finds echoes of Machiavelli’s praising the virtues of 
“the fox”: 
[T]he one who has known best how to use the fox has come out 
best.  But it is necessary to know well how to color this nature, and 
to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple and 
so obedient to present necessities that he who deceives will always 
find someone who will let himself be deceived.116 
But should lawyers resign themselves to living and practicing in a 
Machiavellian world in which negotiation is a faith-breaking game, whose 
participants will jockey for advantage through the astute disclosure of 
useful truths,117 with measured doses of deception about those not 
 
115. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 69; see also Alan Strudler, On the Ethics of Deception 
in Negotiation, in CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR 
NEGOTIATORS 138, 138 (2004) (“The truth can get in the way of a good deal.  So many people lie, 
dissimulate, and otherwise fail to tell the truth in negotiation. . . .  [D]espite the commonsense 
moral presumption against deception more generally, some deception in negotiation, including lies 
about one’s reservation price, may be morally acceptable.”  (footnote omitted)).   
116. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 70.  It is noteworthy that Hazard embraces, in many 
respects, the Machiavellian moral roots of his negotiation ethics: 
The practice of law thus considered is incompatible with traditional virtues of 
autonomy, impartiality, and openness.  It is, on the contrary, a Machiavellian calling, 
like politics, management, and other relationships in ordinary life. . . .  Machiavelli 
still has a bad name, although his reputation has improved through the respectful 
attention he received from Sir Isaiah Berlin. Yet Machiavelli had profound insights, 
particularly in the claims that institutional structures are extremely vulnerable and that 
dissimulation is a useful alternative to physical force.  Clients are also vulnerable or 
[should] consider themselves so; otherwise, they would not be seeking lawyers’ 
assistance. 
Hazard, supra note 105, at 89 (citing Isaiah Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, in AGAINST 
THE CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1979)); cf. BOK, supra note 41, at 29 
(remarking that Machiavelli, along with Friedrich Nietzsche, celebrated and advocated for the 
“hero” who “uses deceit to survive and to conquer,” portraying such persons’ deceit “with bravado 
and exultation”). 
117. Machiavelli regards faith keeping and faith breaking as equally praiseworthy, provided 
each is astutely and usefully employed: 
How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his faith, and to live with honesty and 
not by astuteness, everyone understands.  Nonetheless one sees by experience in our 
times that the princes who have done great things are those who have taken little 
account of faith and have known how to get around men’s brains with their astuteness; 
and in the end they have overcome those who have founded themselves on loyalty. 
MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 68-69. 
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useful?118  In a contest of interactive decision making involving 
informational risk, the temptation to resort to untruthfulness is a real one.119  
But for lawyers as individual human persons, and for the profession in 
which they practice and on which their clients and communities rely, the 
decision to succumb to this temptation is also hazardous.  Although 
“gamesmanship is not ethics,”120 it is nevertheless fraught with moral risks. 
B. MORAL RISKS TO LAWYER INTEGRITY: NOTHING BUT 
“EFFECTUAL TRUTH”? 
This article uses the term “moral risks” to express the threats of harm 
to moral character created by a person’s decisions and actions.121  These 
risks may exist either for the individual person, for individual third persons 
who are directly impacted by the decisions and actions, or for a community 
of persons who experience their indirect impacts.  Negotiating practices that 
have sprouted up from Machiavellian faith breaking and “effectual truth” 
pose moral risks to a lawyer’s integrity, to the lawyer’s clients, and to the 
community in which the lawyer lives and practices. 
Machiavelli understands himself to be a realist, providing “useful” 
advice: 
 
118. Peter C. Cramton & J. Gregory Dees have offered advice on business negotiation ethics 
seeking to account for Machiavellian realities in the business world while upholding moral ideals:  
The Machiavellian gap between what is done and what (ideally) ought to be done is 
real when it comes to deception in business negotiations.  A purely moralistic (or 
philosophical) response is likely to be ineffective.  A Machiavellian response is likely 
to make things worse. . . .  [W]e prefer to explore means of constructively narrowing 
the gap, thereby making the world more honest.   
Cramton & Dees, supra note 92, at 110. 
119. See Bruce P. Frohnen & Brian D. Eck, Whom Do You Trust? Lying, Truth Telling, and 
the Question of Enforcement, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 425, 455 (2009) (“If the profession’s mores 
against lying were relaxed and attorneys thought lying was ethically insignificant because law is a 
game—or worse yet, a war—it would be natural and inevitable that lawyers would become pirates 
or facilitators of piracy rather than advocates for justice.”); cf. DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 
108 (Neville Horton Smith trans., Simon & Schuster 1995) (1955) (noting when “there is no 
confidence in justice, whatever is useful is declared to be just”). 
120. Rubin, supra note 69, at 586. 
121. A person may or may not recognize that a particular decision or action involves moral 
risk; but, as C. Stephen Evans correctly notes, “The situations in which we are most clearly aware 
of our moral obligations are precisely the ones in which we strongly desire to do what is not 
morally permissible.”  C. STEPHEN EVANS, GOD & MORAL OBLIGATION 159 (2013).  Evans, 
speaking broadly of our moral obligations as human beings, also observes: 
Human cultures that are vastly different in many ways and separated from each other 
historically and geographically have nonetheless generally recognized such principles 
as the following: (1) A general duty not to harm others and a general duty to benefit 
others; (2) Special duties to those with whom one has special relations: friends, 
parents, children, family members, fellow-citizens; (3) Duties to be truthful; (4) Duties 
to keep one’s commitments and promises; (5) Duties to deal fairly and justly with 
others. 
Id. at 178 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
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[S]ince my intent is to write something useful to whoever 
understands it, it has appeared to me more fitting to go directly to 
the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it.  And 
many have imagined republics and principalities that have never 
been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one 
lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for 
what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation.122 
For Machiavelli, the “ruin” to be avoided and the “preservation” to be 
sought are solely grounded in securing power and materialistic outcomes.123  
But what if the “ruin” to be feared is to one’s own moral character, to one’s 
own integrity?  And what if moral virtues are not merely “imagined” ideals 
but instead are enduring aspects of human flourishing that the practice of 
law, including negotiation, places at risk and in need of ongoing care for 
their “preservation”?124 
Reed Elizabeth Loder discusses the meaning of moral integrity for the 
human personality and some reasons why “lying carries significant moral 
risks”125 to a person’s integrity, independent of the harms such lies may also 
cause to others: 
Integrity is difficult to define but, in part, is a condition of 
coherence of the moral personality—its wholeness and harmony.  
To that extent, integrity seems to require principled consistency of 
thought and action.  Integrity is part of personal authenticity, or the 
propensity to act in accordance with one’s genuine feelings and to 
present an image to the world that reflects one’s true self.  Lying 
damages authenticity because it involves making false assertions.  
In using words, a speaker expresses the self.  By knowingly using 
words falsely, the speaker opposes the self in a fragmenting 
way.126 
This understanding of moral integrity—and the dangers to which dishonesty 
subjects it—harmonizes well with an Aristotelian understanding of how 
character forms and deforms, including the virtue of honesty as an element 
of that character.  In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle attributes the 
 
122. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 61. 
123. See supra notes 14, 21-25, and accompanying text. 
124. See DOUGLAS O. LINDER & NANCY LEVIT, THE GOOD LAWYER: SEEKING QUALITY IN 
THE PRACTICE OF LAW 233 (2014) (“Lawyers, more so than most any other professionals, need 
strong moral cores because of the temptations they regularly face to lie, deceive, or fudge.”). 
125. Loder, supra note 53, at 53.  Although “lying is morally suspect,” Loder does not assert 
it is always “necessarily wrong. The moral harms risked in lying, however, mandate . . . 
justification.”  Id. at 53.   
126. Id. at 52 (footnotes omitted).  
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formation of the moral virtues such as honesty to “habituation,” which is 
“repetition in the doing.”127  Just “as a builder becomes a builder by 
building, a just person becomes just by doing just things.  Likewise, by 
acting in an unjust manner in our transactions with others we can become 
unjust.”128  Thus, a person forms the virtue of honesty by the repetition of 
honest actions, or the vice of dishonesty by the repetition of dishonest ones.  
As Bruce P. Frohnen and Brian D. Eck have explained Aristotle’s thought: 
Our nature is such that we can develop in ourselves (as rulers can 
help develop in us through their laws) sets of habits that constitute 
character states.  While no one desires to be vicious (to have the 
character of a vicious person, such as, say, one who is unjust) our 
desire to do vicious things can, if we give in to it and do the 
vicious acts, make us, in fact, vicious.129 
They also observe that “[m]odern studies of human behavior bear out 
the general outlines of Aristotle’s argument as applied to lying: lying is a 
developmental process by which one learns to lie―that is, learns the means 
to make people believe something that is not true.”130  Similarly, Loder 
specifically cautions that “[h]abitual lying may seep into character, 
becoming a fixed and intractable trait.”131  In doing so, it causes damage to 
the self and its moral integrity.132 
 
127. Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 450 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 
20-21 (W. D. Ross trans., Batoche Books 1999), http://socserv2.socsci mcmaster.ca/ 
econ/ugcm/3ll3/aristotle/Ethics.pdf).  
128. Id. at 450-51 (citing ARISTOTLE, supra note 127, at 21). 
129. Id. at 451 (citing ARISTOTLE, supra note 127, at 21, 52, 121).  As Frohnen and Eck 
clarify, “In describing this constancy of character—the solidification of acts into habits and into 
states of character—Aristotle is not claiming that our nature is somehow utterly set in early life, 
but rather that habits, though not innate, become difficult to change once established because they 
become natural to us over time.”  Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, supra note 127, at 121). 
130. Id. (citing CHARLES V. FORD, LIES! LIES! LIES! THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEIT 69 
(1996)); see also BOK, supra note 41, at 25 (“It is easy, a wit observed, to tell a lie, but hard to tell 
only one.”). 
131. Loder, supra note 53, at 52.  Frohnen and Eck describe how “the logic of lying tends 
toward habit formation: few lies can stand on their own―most require follow up lies to keep the 
original deceit from coming to light.”  Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 452.  Lying also 
becomes “self-reinforcing,” because as “[t]he liar’s view of moral distinctions coarsens, 
psychological barriers to lying break down, and the behavior of the liar―even if he or she is not 
caught in the lie―changes in subtle ways such that others treat him or her with less trust.”  Id. 
132. Loder, supra note 53, at 52.  Although habit is important in character formation, 
deformation may occur either gradually through repetition, or rapidly.  As Loder puts it: 
“Something like damage to integrity may occur incrementally, through the habit of ‘small’ 
deceptions over time, or it may occur more precipitously in a given egregious act of deception.”  
Id. at 59.  Moreover, integrity is itself a virtue of the human character, and one I have previously 
described as the unifying virtue for the practice of law.  See McGinniss, Virtue Ethics, supra note 
4, at 38; see also Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 841, 846 (2002) (describing integrity as a personal attribute incorporating the qualities of 
“wholeness” and “constancy,” as well as traits of “distinctiveness” and “strength”). 
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The same ethical principles hold true for a person who becomes a 
member of the legal profession.  If a lawyer is to form and maintain a 
personal and professional character distinguished by its integrity, 
cultivating the virtue of honesty is essential, and shedding and shunning the 
vice of dishonesty is critical.  The world of law practice, though, is a place 
where “opportunities for deception abound.”133  And as Frohnen and Eck 
have said, it is also a world “where deceptive countermeasures are a likely 
response from other lawyers, where others already are defined as 
adversaries and so may easily be defined as enemies not deserving of the 
truth, and where deceptive habits can be the result.”134  Moreover, deceptive 
habits developed in the context of one professional role have a tendency to 
expand and affect conduct in other roles and tasks.135  Thus, lawyer 
integrity faces grave moral risks when lawyers are encouraged by both 
Comment136 and commentator to seek the client’s advantage in negotiation 
by carefully selecting and deploying deceptions about facts or law.137  
These moral risks are by no means assuaged by minimization tactics, such 
as justifying knowingly false statements of fact or law by calling them 
“non-material,” or merely an expression of “opinion” no reasonable person 
in a negotiation should accept as factually based.138 
In this ethical analysis, how do we account for the lawyer’s duty of 
loyalty to the client, including the duty to abide by the client’s objectives 
for the representation and vindicate the client’s legal rights and interests to 
the best of the lawyer’s ability?  Does this duty of loyalty impact what it 
means for a lawyer to be truthful and to exercise the virtue of honesty in a 
negotiation, and, if so, how?  Peter J. Henning has distinguished the 
 
133. BOK, supra note 41, at 121. 
134. Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 452.  In her study of the moral and cultural 
significance of lying, Sissela Bok offers pointed observations about the attitudes and motives that 
underlie the telling of lies:  
Liars share with those they deceive the desire not to be deceived.  As a result, 
their choice to lie is one which they would like to reserve for themselves while 
insisting that others be honest.  They would prefer, in other words, a “free-rider” 
status, giving them the benefits of lying without the risks of being lied to.  Some think 
of this free-rider status as for them alone.  Others extend it to their friends, social 
group, or profession.  
At times, liars operate as if they believed that such a free-rider status is theirs and 
that it excuses them.  At other times, on the contrary, it is the very fact that others do 
lie that excuses their deceptive stance in their own eyes. 
BOK, supra note 41, at 23. 
135. See Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 450 (“[A] liar will not become an honest person 
simply on account of leaving the realm of negotiation and entering that of, say, client billing.   The 
results are bad for the lawyer, the clients, and the legal system.”). 
136. See discussion supra Part III.A (on Rule 4.1 and its Comment). 
137. See discussion supra Parts III.A and IV.A. 
138. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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concepts of “honesty” and “truthfulness” for the practice of law and defined 
and explained the meaning of honesty for lawyers in advocating for their 
clients: 
What does it mean to describe a person as honest?  
Importantly, the term is not the same as truth, which contains an 
objective—and often historical—character, referring to a specific 
past or present state of affairs or course of conduct.  Honesty is 
more of a personal characteristic, referring to the nature of the 
person’s expressions and actions that reflect integrity and 
trustworthiness.139 
. . . . 
An honest lawyer is one who can be trusted.  For the purposes 
of analyzing the rules that govern a lawyer’s conduct, I define 
honesty to mean that an attorney’s expressions and conduct are 
both accurate and authentic.  An accurate statement is one that is 
truthful and does not intentionally deceive or mislead another 
person.  Accuracy deals with the problem of the technically true 
but misleading statement or failure to disclose information that the 
listener would consider important.  A deceptive statement would 
be inaccurate and therefore dishonest.  At the same time, a 
lawyer’s statements will be accurate even if they do not fully 
disclose the truth about a situation.  The attorney-client privilege, 
for example, may restrict what a lawyer can state to third parties, 
and accuracy requires that the lawyer not mislead while he also is 
maintaining the confidences protected by the rules of 
confidentiality.140 
Henning then describes a lawyer’s “authentic expression” as “one that 
comprehends fairly the lawyer’s (and in certain circumstances the client’s) 
intentions.”141  Authenticity implicates the “lawyer’s further obligation to 
ensure that the representation of the client is fair both to the client and to 
others, including courts and opponents.”142  As Henning uses the term 
“fair,” it does not entail the elements of substantive, outcome-related 
fairness for which other legal ethics scholars have advocated.143  Rather, the 
 
139. Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 220 (2006) (emphasis added). 
140. Id. at 221-22 (emphases added). 
141. Id. at 222. 
142. Id. 
143. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 813-17 (1984); Rubin, supra note 69, at 
591-92; Schwartz, supra note 36, at 685-86. 
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fairness found in an honest lawyer’s “authentic expression” consists in its 
compatibility with ensuring adverse parties and their counsel experience 
fair processes in resolving their legal matters.144  It entails, in essence, an 
ethical obligation to engage one’s opponents with respect145 and in good 
faith146 while loyally protecting and serving the client’s interests.147  Thus, 
as Henning notes, “A lawyer’s statements and positions can be authentic 
while favoring the position of the client—indeed, that is required by the 
fiduciary relationship of the lawyer to the client.  Authenticity does not 
mean achieving a result that is less than what the client seeks, so long as the 
lawyer has not acted dishonestly.”148 
By cultivating the virtue of honesty in the practice of law, and 
exercising it with the commitment and constancy that are hallmarks of 
integrity, a lawyer becomes more trustworthy.  As I have noted in writing 
about a lawyer’s moral counseling of clients in the advising role, 
“Trustworthiness is an essentially ‘subjective’ human quality, distinct in 
character from other more objective, largely technique-oriented attributes of 
a good lawyer.”149  Trustworthiness is intrinsically relational,150 and in 
professional life, its presence (or its absence) infuses a lawyer’s 
relationships with clients, courts, and community.151  Thus, for a lawyer, 
building a reputation for trustworthiness, including in the practice of 
negotiation, is a highly worthwhile purpose. 
Having a reputation for trustworthiness, however, is not enough.  It 
would be for Machiavelli.  With his concern only for the “effectual truth” 
about faith keeping―which lies in what you can use it to gain and then 
 
144. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
145. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
146. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
147. Because of professional duties owed to the client, such as confidentiality, Henning 
acknowledges there will be times when an honest lawyer may need “to stand by when the truth is 
obfuscated or undermined.  So be it, so long as the lawyer is honest in the representation.”  
Henning, supra note 139, at 278.  That said,  
[t]hat a statement is technically truthful or has no truth value—the diatribe or personal 
attack—does not make it right for the attorney to offer it.  The attorney must seek to 
advance the interests of the client, which means that the fact that a statement is true 
does not mean that it is proper.  
Id. 
148. Id. at 223. 
149. McGinniss, Virtue and Advice, supra note 5, at 40. 
150. Id. at 39 (citing ROBERT K. VISCHER, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY 
OF LEGAL PRACTICE: LESSONS IN LOVE AND JUSTICE 107 (2013)). 
151. James Boyd White describes the “trustworthy lawyer” as “one who can be trusted to 
perform th[e] task [of mobilizing the materials of persuasion] honestly and intelligently,” offering 
the best argument possible “in light of what can most persuasively and fairly be said on the other 
side.”  White, The Ethics of Argument, supra note 3, at 883.  He adds, “It is the incompetent or 
sleazy lawyer who misrepresents or fudges the nature of the material, and his work is of little 
assistance to anyone.”  Id. 
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preserve for yourself and for those who benefit you152―he snaps the 
appearance of trustworthiness off from its reality: “Everyone sees how you 
appear,” he says; but “few touch what you are.”153  He praises the value of 
appearing to possess qualities regarded as good, such as being “merciful, 
faithful, humane, honest, and religious”; but he warns much more 
emphatically against “always observing them,” which makes them 
“harmful.”154  To Machiavelli, it is imperative “to remain with a spirit built 
so that, if you need not to be those things, you are able and know how to 
change to the contrary.”155  He insists one “needs to have a spirit disposed 
to change as the winds of fortune and variations of things command him, 
and . . . not depart from good, when possible, but know how to enter into 
evil, when forced by necessity.”156  A lawyer, for instance, may be tempted 
to seek immediate rewards by using one’s good reputation and apparent 
trustworthiness to catch an adversary off guard with an unanticipated 
betrayal.157  So a reputation for trustworthiness is not enough. 
The vices Machiavelli calls virtues are inconstancy of character and the 
will to break faith in a manipulative quest for power and unjust advantage 
over others.158  A lawyer with integrity will recognize their viciousness, 
resist them, and cast them away.  The truth of the authentic ideals in a 
lawyer’s character, the virtue of honesty, and a will constituted by good 
faith―these are the necessary foundations for a trustworthiness that is real 
and resilient and for having integrity for the practice of law that deepens 
and endures. 
C. MORAL RISKS TO CLIENTS AND COMMUNITY: RELATIONAL 
HARMS OF BREAKING FAITH 
Just as trustworthiness is intrinsically relational, so is 
untrustworthiness.  It is well known the legal profession struggles against a 
strong current of distrust within our American society, a phenomenon 
driven in part by an increased general tendency toward the distrust of 
others159 but also by attitudes of concern directed specifically at lawyers.160  
 
152. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
153. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 71. 
154. Id. at 70. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Cf. Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 459 (“One will deal differently with someone 
known to be dishonest than with one who has a reputation for veracity and fair dealing.”). 
158. See discussion supra Part II. 
159. See generally Megan Tschannen-Moran & Wayne K. Hoy, A Multidisciplinary Analysis 
of the Nature, Meaning, and Measurement of Trust, 70 REV. EDUC. RES. 547, 549 (2000).  As 
Tschannen-Moran and Hoy explain:  
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This cultural condition only amplifies the moral risks when lawyers break 
faith with their adversaries in negotiations.  Decisions to deceive and acts of 
dishonesty exacerbate relational harms between lawyers and clients and 
between lawyers and their communities, impacting not only the lawyers 
who make those decisions and take those actions, but also their professional 
colleagues in the legal community. 
If prospective clients believe (with reason) that the professional norms, 
customs, and practices of the legal profession permit lawyers to commit 
carefully crafted deceptions in their service, then it should not be surprising 
they might trust their own prospective lawyers less than they would if those 
norms against dishonesty were more categorical.161  That is, a lawyer who 
is permitted to lie and act in bad faith for your advantage, and thereby treat 
others “merely as a means to an end,” is a lawyer you may reasonably 
expect could treat you that way too.162  In the short term, a particular client 
may benefit from a lawyer’s dishonesty, whether rationalized by the lawyer 
as demanded by the norms of zealous advocacy and the duty of loyalty, or 
by the lawyer’s genuine altruistic concern for the client’s welfare.163  But 
 
Trust is not a feeling of warmth or affection but the conscious regulation of one’s 
dependence on another.  In situations of interdependence, trust functions as a way of 
reducing uncertainty.  The philosopher Baier has observed that we notice trust as we 
notice air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted.  As life has grown more complex, 
as changing economic realities and changing expectations in society have made life 
less predictable, and as new forms of information dissemination have increased both 
the desire for and availability of negative information, we are beginning to notice trust 
more. 
Id. at 549 (citations omitted); see also BONHOEFFER, supra note 119, at 108 (reflecting that when 
there is “no confidence in truth . . . even the tacit confidence in one’s fellow-man, which rests on 
the certainty of permanence and constancy, is now superseded by suspicion and an hour-to-hour 
watch on one’s neighbour”). 
160. See, e.g., LINDER & LEVIT, supra note 124, at 237 (“The public often knows full well 
what attorneys are up to when they lead clients through loopholes, dissemble, and obfuscate.  And 
for the most part, they don’t like what they see.”). 
161. Loder describes the “social harms” lies create: 
By using words to make an assertion, a speaker relies on shared expectations that 
people usually mean what they say in words. Thus, lies threaten human 
communication by making linguistic institutions less reliable.  A liar abuses and 
weakens expectations necessary to social life and, to that extent, a lie is a breach of 
trust.   According to philosopher Immanuel Kant, every lie is an offense to humanity. 
Loder, supra note 53, at 51-52. 
162. Cf. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 195, 205 (1996) 
(“When a good person lies she seems to confront and then abuse the dignity of the person she lies 
to—an action that offends both the Kantian notion that a human person should never be used 
merely as a means to an end, and the ideology that yearns for a communitarian ethic.”). 
163. Recent psychological research findings show that “dishonesty is . . . more likely when 
the cheating is done to help another person,” which has been called “altruistic cheating.”  LINDER 
& LEVIT, supra note 124, at 239 (quoting DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT 
DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE TO EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES 222 (2012)).  “When you 
help someone you really care about, it becomes easy to cheat and at the same time still think of 
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once the Machiavellian foot is allowed in the door of the lawyer-client 
relationship, clients should not be thought unwise to guard against its 
influence in their own communications with their lawyers.  As Frohnen and 
Eck express a similar point, “[T]he norm of truth telling must be defended 
[all the] more vigorously because the legal profession itself is rooted in a 
rejection of the call to lying, being rooted instead in a commitment to trust 
embodied in the relationship between lawyer and client.”164  Moreover, 
decreasing trust between lawyers and clients, and between lawyers and 
adverse parties, may cause substantial practical detriments to clients by 
increasing the transaction costs (both time and money) involved in 
receiving legal services.165  And as Loder wisely notes, “Prevalent public 
mistrust of lawyers may suggest that clients would prefer to hire lawyers 
concerned with honesty and fairness, especially if lawyers were to educate 
prospective clients about the relationship between being effective and being 
ethical.”166 
Beyond the immediate moral risk of harm to relationships with clients, 
faith-breaking practices in negotiation also cause harm to lawyers’ 
relationships with each other as colleagues in a legal community.  Frohnen 
and Eck observe that “for trust to form in a particular profession or 
community, the actors must be interdependent—and thus vulnerable—but 
confident enough in the competence and shared norms of the other actors 
and in the mutual goodwill surrounding their relationships that they remain 
willing to risk the cost of betrayal.”167  Even scholars who make some 
allowances for the deliberate use of deceptive tactics in negotiation have 
recognized the damage such actions may have on a lawyer’s professional 
reputation and effectiveness.  Craver, for example, strongly criticizes the 
“highly aggressive, deliberately deceptive, or equally opprobrious 
bargaining tactics” recommended in some “popular negotiation books,” 
 
yourself as a basically good and honest person; it’s harder to do that when you cheat for selfish 
reasons.”  Id.  
164. Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 457.   
165. Frohnen and Eck point out: 
When attorneys must expend time and energy to formalize agreements and fight 
out disputes, the parties are the ones who pay.  In the short term, obviously, distrust 
increases billable hours for lawyers.  But the costs are very real.  Certainly the 
prosperity of society as a whole (a whole of which lawyers are a part) depends in large 
measure on the amount of trust inhering in the culture.  It is trust in colleagues and 
trading partners that cements relationships and allows for extensions of credit and 
other actions necessary for continued economic growth and prosperity in the face of 
crises and more typical market (and other) uncertainty.  Without trust, even the most 
basic economic relations break down. 
Id. at 454-55 (footnotes omitted) (citing Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, supra note 159, at 550). 
166. Loder, supra note 53, at 101.  
167. Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 459. 
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whose authors “usually conclude these stories with parenthetical admissions 
that their bilked adversaries would probably be reluctant to interact with 
them in the future.”168  He explains why he rejects their advice: 
When negotiators engage in such questionable behavior that they 
would find it difficult, if not impossible, to transact future business 
with their adversaries, they have usually transcended the bounds of 
propriety.  No legal representatives should be willing to jeopardize 
long-term professional relationships for the narrow interests of 
particular clients.  Zealous representation should never be thought 
to require the employment of personally compromising techniques. 
. . . . 
Untrustworthy advocates encounter substantial difficulty 
when they negotiate with others.  Their oral representations have 
to be verified and reduced to writing, and many opponents even 
distrust their written documents.  Negotiations are especially 
problematic and cumbersome.  If nothing else moves practitioners 
to behave in an ethical and dignified manner, their hope for long 
and successful legal careers should induce them to avoid conduct 
that may undermine their future effectiveness.169 
James J. White, well-known for his view that deception is inherent in 
the negotiation process, also opines the norms and expectations for “truth 
and candor” in negotiations may be different in a smaller legal 
community.170  Each of these scholars, however, focuses most of his 
attention on outcome-driven considerations, such as costs and effectiveness.  
As lawyers enter the legal profession, join legal communities (small or 
large), and begin to engage in negotiations, the lessons they learn from 
 
168. CRAVER, supra note 108, § 17.04, at 621. 
169. Id. § 17.04, at 621-22. 
170. As he explains: 
[I]t seems plausible that one’s expectation concerning truth and candor might be 
different in a small, homogeneous community from what it would be in a large, 
heterogeneous community of lawyers. . . .  Moreover, the costs of conformity to 
ethical norms are less in a small community.  Because the community is small, it will 
be easy to know those who do not conform to the standards and to protect oneself 
against that small number.  Conversely, in the large and heterogeneous community, 
one will not have confidence either about the norms that have been learned by the 
opposing negotiator or about his conformance to those norms. 
White, Machiavelli and the Bar, supra note 29, at 930.  Smaller legal communities also create 
greater likelihoods of repeated interactions with the same lawyers, allowing for greater prospects 
of developing knowledge-based trust (or distrust).  See Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, supra note 159, 
at 562 (“Knowledge-based trust emerges on the basis of the quality of the social exchanges in 
recurring interactions between trustor and trustee over time.  It takes root as actors get to know 
one another and feel able to predict how the other is likely to behave in a given situation.”  
(citations omitted)). 
          
2015] BREAKING FAITH 287 
more experienced lawyers about good faith and honest dealing with their 
adversaries may have profound impacts on them, both personally and 
professionally.  And as Loder points out, “The job satisfaction and character 
dispositions of lawyers learning from dishonest lawyers . . . are concerns.  If 
prevalent and widely accepted, such character flaws ultimately become 
profession-wide traits that reduce public esteem and trust.”171 
To improve the prospects that such intrinsic values and professional 
virtues will be successfully transmitted within a legal community, Frohnen 
and Eck advocate expanded bar mentoring programs, as well as support for 
and expansion of the American Inns of Court and its apprenticeship model, 
as a means to resuscitate and maintain “practical norms that can rebuild 
trust among lawyers and between lawyers and other members of society.”172  
In their view, what is most important is “the cultivation of norms, especially 
of truth telling, in small, face to face relationships, and their enforcement in 
social networks of the scale and embedding character necessary for the 
functioning of reputation effects.”173  Finally, from the standpoint of the 
individual lawyer who desires to practice law with the virtue of honesty and 
integrity, the choice of a compatible legal community is often a critical one, 
especially at the law firm level.174 
Resisting Machiavellian temptations and zealously advocating for and 
loyally protecting one’s clients is a high challenge, even when lawyers 
individually or as a community place a high value on the virtue of honesty 
and its practice in negotiation.  This article will now explore a framework 
for understanding what it means to keep faith with opponents, clients, and 
community in negotiation, and it will also suggest how its limitations might 
be defined by process, not substance, in realizing this faith-keeping ideal. 
V. VIRTUOUS NEGOTIATION: KEEPING FAITH WITH 
OPPONENTS, CLIENTS, AND COMMUNITY 
In his 1983 article, The Ethics of Argument: Plato’s Gorgias and the 
Modern Lawyer, James Boyd White describes “the good lawyer” as one 
 
171. Loder, supra note 53, at 75; see also Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, supra note 159, at 550 
(“Distrust tends to provoke feelings of anxiety and insecurity, causing people to feel 
uncomfortable and ill at ease and to expend energy on monitoring the behavior and possible 
motives of others.”). 
172. Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 461-63. 
173. Id. at 463. 
174. Douglas O. Linder and Nancy Levit observe that “[d]ishonesty . . . increases when 
others around you are being dishonest, so if you want to be an honest lawyer, join a firm where 
honesty is valued.”  LINDER & LEVIT, supra note 124, at 238.  “That lesson,” moreover, “extends 
to your choice of practice area.  If you work in a field of law where you suspect widespread 
cheating by your adversaries, you are much more likely to engage in similar conduct yourself.”  
Id. at 238-39. 
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who “is faithful to the obligations he has assumed, to the client and to the 
law.”175  He adds “there is at once a kind of virtue and a kind of education 
in that. . . .  [H]is argument must be punctiliously truthful in every 
statement of fact.”176  This passage is specifically directed to a lawyer’s 
advocacy before a court; but its ideals should also extend to lawyer 
negotiation. 
In a much-debated article published more than 40 years ago, Judge 
Alvin B. Rubin sounds his call for lawyers to negotiate with honesty and in 
good faith: 
[T]he profession should embrace an affirmative ethical standard 
for attorneys’ professional relationships with courts, other lawyers 
and the public: The lawyer must act honestly and in good faith.  
Another lawyer, or a layman, who deals with a lawyer should not 
need to exercise the same degree of caution that he would if 
trading for reputedly antique copper jugs in an oriental bazaar.  It 
is inherent in the concept of an ethic, as a principle of good 
conduct, that it is morally binding on the conscience of the 
professional, and not merely a rule of the game adopted because 
other players observe (or fail to adopt) the same rule.177 
Yet Judge Rubin takes his plea to the profession a step beyond honesty and 
good faith in the negotiation process; he advocates an ethical standard by 
which lawyers would bear legal and moral responsibility for the substantive 
fairness of outcome to the adverse party (i.e., avoiding “unconscionable” 
resolutions of legal matters).178  At the stage of the lawyer-client 
relationship in which the lawyer has assumed the role of advocate, holding 
the lawyer to account for the substantive fairness of the negotiation reaches 
too far against the duties of zeal and loyalty.179  But good faith and honest 
 
175. White, The Ethics of Argument, supra note 3, at 894. 
176. Id. 
177. Rubin, supra note 69, at 589. 
178. Id. at 590; see also Schwartz, supra note 36, at 671 (expressing his view negotiating 
lawyers are morally obligated to “refrain from assisting the client by ‘unconscionable’ means or 
from aiming to achieve ‘unconscionable’ ends, with the term ‘unconscionable’ drawing its 
meaning largely from the substantive law of rescission, reformation, and torts”).   
179. Carrie Menkel-Meadow has identified the “ten most important things to add to the 
existing ethical codes” in order “to encourage more mediational, less adversarial approaches to 
lawyering,” including these four:  
4. Lawyers should not misrepresent or conceal a relevant fact or legal principle to 
another person (including opposing counsel, parties, judicial officers, third-party 
neutrals, or other individuals who might rely on such statements). 
5. Lawyers should not intentionally or recklessly deceive another or refuse to answer 
material and relevant questions in representing clients. 
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dealing―which includes, without limitation, the accuracy and authenticity 
of a lawyer’s communications―are worthy ideals for virtuous negotiation.  
These ideals encourage negotiating lawyers to regard and treat opposing 
counsel and parties with respect, as human beings who are ends in 
themselves, rather than merely as means to an end.  At the same time, they 
comport with the lawyer’s ethical duties to clients, including the duty of 
loyalty, and promote the flourishing of the lawyer’s community and the 
interests of justice by facilitating fair processes in negotiation. 
A. OPPONENTS: RESPECT FOR OTHER PERSONS 
Lawyers should never lose sight of the humanity of their clients; no 
more should they do so with their opponents in the practice of law.180  
Jonathan R. Cohen observes, “Usually we think of other people as, well, 
people”; but the practice and process of “negotiation may pull us towards 
seeing others as mere instruments for achieving our purposes.  To borrow 
from the language of Martin Buber, in negotiation we are drawn towards 
reducing the other person from a ‘Thou’ to an ‘It.’”181  He describes this 
ethical challenge in negotiation as an “object-subject tension: when 
negotiating, how is one to reconcile the impulse to treat the other person as 
a mere means towards one’s ends with general ethical requirements for 
 
6. Lawyers should not agree to a resolution of a problem or participate in a transaction 
that they have reason to know will cause substantial injustice to the opposing party.  In 
essence, a lawyer should do no harm. . . . 
10. Lawyers should treat all parties to a legal matter as they would wish to be treated 
themselves and should consider the effects of what they accomplish for their clients or 
others.  In essence, lawyers should respect a lawyer’s golden rule. 
Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, supra note 58, at 136.   
Menkel-Meadow’s fourth point is an advisable norm for promoting a fair negotiation process 
through good faith and honest dealing.  The fifth point is also advisable, except that an expectation 
that lawyers will not “refuse to answer material and relevant questions” is overbroad, in light of 
the negotiating lawyer’s duties of confidentiality and the role of a loyal and zealous advocate.  The 
sixth point reflects a highly inadvisable “substantive fairness” standard.  Finally, the tenth point 
reflects very effectively the notion of “good faith” and is an advisable norm, emphasizing as a 
critical limitation that a lawyer should “consider the effects” of their actions.  It is appropriate for 
a lawyer to “consider” those substantive effects and their fairness to others without necessarily 
allowing them to thwart the client’s lawful objectives for the lawyer’s advocacy.  In some cases, 
such consideration of effects may result in the lawyer either advising the client of alternative 
approaches under Rule 2.1 or, in extreme cases, withdrawing from the representation under Rule 
1.16(b).  As to “a lawyer’s golden rule,” this moral principle is consistent with my 
recommendations for lawyer good faith and honest dealing in negotiation.  See generally Matthew 
7:12 (NRSV) (“In everything do to others as you would have them do to you.”). 
180. See McGinniss, Virtue and Advice, supra note 5, at 42-43 (offering an aspiration for 
lawyers “to recognize, and love, the client as a neighbor,” and, “[i]n engaging the client as a 
neighbor, and as a subject,” to encourage “the client to see the persons with whom they have 
disputes in a similar light” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
181. Cohen, supra note 97, at 743 (citing MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Walter Kaufman 
trans., 1970)). 
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treating people?”182   He responds by arguing “in negotiation one should see 
the other party both as a means towards one’s ends and as a person 
deserving respect.  More specifically, the act of negotiation does not relieve 
one of the moral duty to respect others.”183  This moral duty to respect other 
human beings, even in the context of a legal contest in which one represents 
a client, provides an important source of support for lawyers to adhere to an 
ethical norm for negotiation founded on principles of good faith and honest 
dealing.184 
[I]n negotiation one should assume a respectful stance towards the 
other person, for that other person is a being with fundamental 
dignity who merits respect.  I conceive of this duty of respecting 
the other person primarily in internal terms, that is, of seeing the 
other person not merely as an instrument or object but also as a 
person.  However, this duty also has both negative implications 
(e.g., refraining from deception, coercion, threats, incivility, and 
psychological assaults) and positive implications (e.g., treating 
others fairly, listening to them, and respecting their autonomy) for 
one’s actions.185 
Cohen observes the word “respect” derives from the Latin prefix “re” 
(meaning “again”) and verb “specere” (meaning “to look”), and that respect 
entails a choice to “look again” before treating a person in a manner 
inconsistent with recognition of their “fundamental dignity.”186 
 
182. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
183. Id.; see also id. at 761 (“If in a negotiation I see you as no more than a means, then I 
have not only defined you as an object, but I have also defined myself as a manipulator.  How one 
negotiates helps define one’s identity.”). 
184. See id. at 760-61; see also Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 453 (“Once words are no 
longer aimed at communicating facts and states that reflect reality, they cease to be a tool for 
sharing one’s apprehension of reality or forging meaningful shared understanding and trust as the 
basis of common action,” and “[w]hen words mean whatever we want them to mean, they become 
nothing more than a tool for subjugating others to our will.”).  Charles Fried describes lying as 
exploitative and disrespectful to the person to whom the lie is told: 
Lying is wrong because when I lie I set up a relation which is essentially 
exploitative.  It violates the principle of respect, for I must affirm that the mind of 
another person is available to me in a way in which I cannot agree my mind would be 
available to him—for if I do so agree, then I would not expect my lie to be believed. 
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 67 (1978). 
185. Cohen, supra note 97, at 743.  Being an agent of the client, who may disrespect the 
opposing party and may direct the lawyer to show disrespect, “does not excuse the [lawyer] from 
the moral duty to respect the other party.”  Id. at 744. 
186. Id. at 760.  Cohen acknowledges how difficult it may be to maintain a respectful stance 
toward others in negotiation, but submits it is a challenge well worth undertaking: 
The struggle to grapple with morality so as to change one’s conduct is not an easy 
one.  Socrates’ trait of probing beneath his society’s surface and revealing its 
hypocrisies led to his death.  When grappling with the angel, Jacob wrenched his hip.  
For some, facing the extent to which one objectifies others in negotiation—which by 
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After examining in detail what negotiating with respect looks like, 
Cohen asks, “[M]ight the ethics codes include language such as, ‘In 
negotiation as well as other matters, a lawyer should attempt to maintain 
respect for the dignity of all persons, including that of the opposing party 
and counsel?’”187  He does not, however, recommend that this be a 
professional conduct standard subject to disciplinary enforcement.188  Nor 
does he contend negotiating with respect will necessarily (or at least 
consistently) be materially advantageous in outcome.189  That said, he does 
make a strong case that in most situations, “respecting the other party will 
facilitate his or her cooperation which, if it affects the outcome at all, will 
usually be to one’s benefit.”190  Although Cohen emphasizes “[s]uch 
strategic efficacy does not provide the moral grounding for the duty to 
respect others in negotiation (viz., because they are persons),” it 
nevertheless “helps refute some arguments that might be advanced against 
that duty on their own terms.”191  For Cohen, negotiating with respect and 
treating the opposition with dignity constitutes a “vision of ethical behavior 
in negotiation that rests on one’s own behavior rather than the other side’s 
presumed cooperation.”192  In such a spirit, Cohen offers this perspective on 
the lawyer’s will to be moral, exercising independent professional judgment 
about words to be spoken and actions to be taken: 
 
implication may force one to face the extent to which one objectifies others 
generally—can be a painful experience.  It involves facing the part of ourselves that 
would simply use others with disregard to all else. Yet the personal benefits from such 
struggle can be tremendous.  Most obvious are developing one’s moral integrity and, 
relatedly, one’s sense of connectedness to other persons. 
Id. at 767. 
187. Id. at 793. 
188. See id. at 801-02.  In a section of his article entitled “A Response to Realist 
Skepticism,” Cohen acknowledges his ideals for respect in lawyer negotiation are subject to the 
criticism that they fail to account for the frailties of human nature: 
Madison once remarked that, “If men were angels, no government [and hence 
laws] would be necessary.”  I suspect that some readers will react to this Article with a 
similar realist skepticism. “If people want to see others as more than objects in 
negotiation, that’s fine, and I suppose there might be a few such people out there.  But 
most people are not going to do that.  The ethical vision you have presented is an 
unrealistic, Pollyanna one.  At bottom, you have talked about lofty ethical goals, but 
you have said that sanctioning will not work to promote them and that education 
ultimately provides the best hope.  If men were angels that might work, but they are 
not, especially the worst of them.   
Id. at 801 (footnote omitted) (quoting James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, quoted in THE 
ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST: A NEW READING OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Quentin P. Taylor ed., 
1998)). 
189. Id. at 801-02.   
190. Id. at 744.   
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 802. 
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The greatest obstacle, in my opinion, to the claims of 
orientation ethics are not the challenges of how such ethics can be 
pursued and promoted, but whether we ultimately want to do so.  
What negotiation ethics we adopt, or fail to adopt, are matters of 
human choice.  Are we willing to give up seeing others as mere 
objects and measuring our worth solely by our material 
achievements?  If we do, there is great moral and hence 
psychological benefit to be had, irrespective of whether others 
follow that path.193 
When a negotiating lawyer knowingly misrepresents facts or law to an 
opponent—regardless of materiality—the lawyer is lying.194  And even if 
these lies were not told for effectual Machiavellian advantage, they would 
still be neither benign nor harmless.  As Thomas L. Shaffer has said, when 
one lawyer lies to another, the lawyer is “lying to a professional friend.”195  
Even though the clients in some cases may be “enemies,” their “[l]awyers 
live and work in a community of lawyers,”196 and their zealous advocacy 
for their clients need not make them breakers of faith with each other.197  
Moreover, as Shaffer wisely observes, “Lying destroys character.  It 
destroys relationships.  It destroys communities.  Ethical reasoning 
(whether from analysis of statements or from stories) that justifies lying in 
rare and extreme cases . . . is useless unless the warnings on the label are as 
stark as that.”198  And when the adverse party is unrepresented, a lawyer’s 
 
193. Id. 
194. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
195. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, supra note 162, at 207. 
196. Id.; see also id. at 208 (“When I deal with the lawyer for the other side, who is not my 
enemy, I deal, within a community and within concentric circles of communities, with the noblest 
work of God, as much as when I deal with my own client.”).  
197. See supra notes 2, 7, 19-26, 114-17, and accompanying text (on Machiavelli’s “breaker 
of faith”); cf. Al Sturgeon, The Truth Shall Set You Free: A Distinctively Christian Approach to 
Deception in the Negotiation Process, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 395, 396 (2011) (“Christianity 
calls its adherents to practice truthfulness in negotiations, to live free from the forces that 
engender deception, and to form healthy relationships with others based on reliability.”). 
198. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, supra note 162, at 211.  Shaffer illustrates his moral 
points about lying through the example of lawyer Atticus Finch in Harper Lee’s To Kill a 
Mockingbird.  In the novel, Atticus “lies to protect his neighbor Boo Radley from being identified 
as a hero and thereby dragged from his seclusion and privacy and subjected to the kindness of the 
ladies of Maycomb, Alabama”; Atticus’s daughter Scout says “bringing Boo Radley into the civil 
limelight would be like killing a mockingbird.”  Id. at 202.  As Shaffer interprets this story: 
Atticus Finch lied and saved his character (Scout said that his story was the story of a 
conscience), but we know that the lie brought him pain, and that he would not easily 
lie again.  
. . . How do I know that?  The answer is that his story is the story of a truthful 
person.  He was truthful within his community and, more importantly, he was truthful 
to himself. . . .  Even his lie was a lie told in reference to the community; the 
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lies find a more vulnerable audience, causing potential harm more directly 
to the public trust and just as deforming to the lawyer’s character for 
honesty.199 
How should a morally sound normative standard for honest dealing in 
negotiation be defined and described?  As discussed previously, Peter J. 
Henning explains the meaning of honesty for lawyers in advocating for 
their clients in terms of expressions and conduct that are accurate and 
authentic.200  In negotiation, I propose this accuracy requires a lawyer to 
make statements based on at least a minimum foundation of objective 
truthfulness, as well as fulsome enough in disclosure to avoid a knowing or 
intentional deception by omission.201  But I further propose this does not 
uniformly require disclosure of all relevant information known to the 
lawyer, particularly when such information is protected by attorney-client 
privilege or other confidential information the client has not expressly or 
impliedly authorized the lawyer to disclose.202   With respect to professional 
conduct rules enforceable by disciplinary sanctions, I also propose the 
expectation of honesty in negotiation should be the same as for a lawyer 
 
community could not know the truth in that rare instance, but it would have 
understood the necessity for the lie.   
Id. at 211-12 (emphasis added).  How ready and how real is the contrast between Atticus Finch’s 
lie for mercy’s sake and Machiavellian’s advocacy of faith breaking for the “necessities” of 
achieving power and gaining advantage.  See supra Part II; cf. BONHOEFFER, supra note 119, at 
359 (“‘Telling the truth’ . . . is not solely a matter of moral character; [but] is also a matter of 
correct appreciation of real situations and of serious reflection upon them.  The more complex the 
actual situations of a man’s life, the more responsible and the more difficult will be his task of 
‘telling the truth.’”). 
199. As Shaffer has said, our understanding of a lawyer’s moral duties to the opposing party 
has been influenced by (and found confusion in) our adversarial system: 
The adversary ethic in America is a unique professional notion.  It is a departure 
both from classical moral philosophy and from the American religious tradition. . . .  
The adversary ethic describes professional practice as an occupation carried on in 
a society of strangers, in which conventional moral connections are weak between, for 
example, one lawyer representing his client and another lawyer’s client.  Some sense 
of moral duty runs from one lawyer to the other lawyer’s client, but the explanation of 
that duty is incoherent, pre-rational, and undeveloped. 
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697, 
699 (1988). 
200. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.  I will further address authenticity infra 
in Part V.C in the context of justice through fair processes. 
201. Cf. Henning, supra note 139, at 221-22 (“An accurate statement is one that is truthful 
and does not intentionally deceive or mislead another person.  Accuracy deals with the problem of 
the technically true but misleading statement or failure to disclose information that the listener 
would consider important.”). 
202. Cf. id. at 222 (noting “[a]t the same time, a lawyer’s statements will be accurate even if 
they do not fully disclose the truth about a situation,” such as where attorney-client privilege or 
the duty of confidentiality protects the information). 
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making a statement of fact or law before a tribunal.203  In particular, as is 
already the case in states such as North Dakota, no materiality limitation 
should be recognized for distinguishing a lawyer’s honest statements from 
dishonest ones in negotiation.204 
How would a morally sound normative standard for honest dealing in 
negotiation realistically work in practice?  Hypothetical negotiations 
described by Charles B. Craver and Reed Elizabeth Loder provide helpful 
examples of how dishonest tactics could be readily transformed into honest 
ones.  After observing how “ironic” it is that “deceptive tactics are usually 
employed at the outset of bargaining transactions,” Craver proceeds to give 
an example: 
 
203. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer 
shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . .”); id. r. 3.3(a)(3) 
(“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”); see also 
id. r. 3.3 cmt. 3 (“[A]n assertion purporting to be on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an 
affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the 
lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent 
inquiry.”); id. r. 3.3 cmt. 4 (“A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the 
law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities.”).  Michael H. Rubin 
advocates a “single ethical standard” to govern both “non-litigation and litigation lawyer 
conduct,” specifically with regard to the use of deception and misrepresentation.  Michael H. 
Rubin, The Ethics of Negotiations: Are There Any?, 56 LA. L. REV. 447, 449 (1995).  He advises 
lawyers: 
If you would not do something in the courtroom context, if you would not make a 
misleading statement in a settlement conference with a judge, and if you would not 
remain silent about a misstatement made by your client or partner during discussions 
in court chambers or in open court, then you should not do any of these things in non-
litigation negotiations, whether or not they take place prior to or after the filing of a 
lawsuit. 
Id. at 476; see also Sturgeon, supra note 197, at 419 (“From a Christian perspective, negotiators 
would use the same level of honesty in a negotiation as they would under oath in a court of law.”). 
204. See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota’s Rule 4.1 and 
James J. Alfini’s proposed revisions to the Model Rule, including omission of the materiality 
limitation in Rule 4.1(a)).  A 1980 Discussion Draft of a proposed Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 4.2 (Fairness to Other Participants) specifically directed to negotiations included a 
section (b), stating: 
A lawyer shall not make a knowing misrepresentation of fact or law, or fail to disclose 
a material fact known to the lawyer, even if adverse, when disclosure is:  
(1) required by law or the rules of professional conduct; or  
(2) necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension of fact or law resulting from a 
previous representation made by the lawyer or known by the lawyer to have been 
made by the client, except that counsel for an accused in a criminal case is not 
required to make such a correction when it would require disclosing a 
misrepresentation made by the accused. 
ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of Prof’l Standards, Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 4.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).  Proposed Rule 4.2(b) offers a formulation of 
affirmative disclosure requirements well worth reconsidering along with the recommended 
deletion of the materiality limitation in the false statement provision in current Rule 4.1.  The 
1980 proposed Rule 4.2(a) would also have imposed a mandatory professional conduct duty of a 
lawyer to be “fair in dealing with other participants” in a negotiation.  I disagree with imposing 
such a mandatory standard for the reasons discussed infra in Parts V.B and V.C.   
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Side A, which is willing to pay 2 X[,] informs Side B that it cannot 
pay more than X.  Side B, which is willing to accept 1 1/2 X, 
states that it must obtain at least 2 1/2 X if a deal is to be achieved.  
Both participants are pleased that their interaction has begun 
successfully, even though both have begun with intentionally 
misleading statements.  Some lawyers attempt to circumvent this 
moral dilemma by formulating opening positions that do not 
directly misstate their actual intentions.  For example, Side A may 
indicate that it “doesn’t wish to pay more than X,” or Side B may 
say that it “would not be inclined to accept less than 2 1/2 X.”  
While these preliminary statements may be technically true, the 
italicized verbal leaks (“wish to”/”inclined to”) would inform 
attentive opponents that these speakers do not really mean what 
they appear to be communicating.205 
Elsewhere, however, Craver acknowledges reasonable alternatives do, 
in fact, exist to avoid making false statements about client settlement 
authority and “bottom line” terms: 
Negotiators who know they cannot avoid the impact of 
questions concerning their authorized limits by labeling them 
“unfair” and who find it difficult to provide knowingly false 
responses can employ an alternative approach.  If the plaintiff 
lawyer who is demanding $120,000 asks the defendant attorney 
who is presently offering $85,000 whether he or she is authorized 
to provide $100,000, the recipient may treat the $100,000 figure as 
a new plaintiff proposal.  That individual can reply that the 
$100,000 sum suggested by plaintiff counsel is more realistic but 
still exorbitant.  The plaintiff attorney may become preoccupied 
with the need to clarify the fact that he or she did not intend to 
suggest any reduction in his or her outstanding $120,000 demand.  
 
205. CRAVER, supra note 108, § 17.01[2], at 592-93.  Craver’s guidance that such a false 
statement of fact about settlement authority is permitted by Rule 4.1(a) is in substantial tension 
with the 2006 ABA Committee opinion on a lawyer’s obligation of truthfulness when representing 
a client: 
[W]hether in direct negotiation or in a caucused mediation, care must be taken by the 
lawyer to ensure that communications regarding the client’s position, which otherwise 
would not be considered statements “of fact,” are not conveyed in language that 
converts them, even inadvertently, into false factual representations.  For example, 
even though the client’s Board of Directors has authorized a higher settlement figure, 
a lawyer may state in a negotiation that the client does not wish to settle for more than 
$50.  However, it would not be permissible for the lawyer to state that the Board of 
Directors had formally disapproved any settlement in excess of $50, when authority 
had in fact been granted to settle for a higher sum. 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439, at 8 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
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That person would probably forego further attempts to ascertain 
the authorized limits possessed by the defendant attorney!206 
If a non-deceptive alternative to a false statement of fact is available 
(regardless of materiality), an honest lawyer should adopt that approach and 
resist the Machiavellian temptation to use a lie’s merely “effectual truth” 
for the benefit of the client and, as is the tendency in doing so, for the 
benefit of the self. 
Loder’s example illustrates quite well how a negotiating lawyer might 
offer a non-deceptive statement about settlement authority or “bottom line” 
terms: 
If the point is to persuade the opponent that an offer is too low, a 
well[-]supported opinion about a minimum fair figure may go as 
far or farther than an assertion about bottom line.  Instead of 
saying, “my client won’t accept less than $20,000,” the lawyer 
might have said, “I would advise my client that the case justifies 
$20,000,” or simply, “the case appears worth $20,000,” followed 
by reasons supporting those high-end assessments.  These 
statements reflect the lawyer’s considered opinion and are truthful 
even if they are at the upper end of the lawyer’s actual estimations 
of a reasonable settlement range.  The statements are not damaging 
because the opponent can present counter-arguments supporting a 
chiseled-down settlement figure. 
These statements do convey some important information 
about the client’s willingness to settle for a certain amount, 
because the opponent understands that the lawyer’s opinion of a 
case’s worth generally influences the client’s expectations.  The 
lawyer is not saying untruthfully that she or the client will refuse 
to consider lower proposals.  Rather, she is challenging the 
opponent to support such proposals with reasons not adequately 
considered or weighed in the thinking she already has presented. 
Thus her statements about case-worth can pave the way for a 
mutually beneficial and truthful exchange about the support for 
various bargaining positions.  This openness to exchange is not an 
admission of weakness but a mutual recognition that most good 
legal decisions are not fixed stars, but involve justified selections 
from a limited array of possibilities.207 
 
206. Craver, supra note 52, at 728. 
207. Loder, supra note 53, at 76 (footnotes omitted). 
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Finally, Loder correctly emphasizes negotiating with honesty does not 
“imply that lawyers should spill their guts to their opposing negotiators,” 
and “silence is not deception without some duty to disclose.”208  As she 
astutely adds: 
Although a duty to correct manifest misunderstandings may well 
be justified by principles of justice, professionalism, and moral 
integrity, such a duty is not automatic throughout negotiation.  
Lawyers generally reserve the latitude to refuse to answer specific 
questions without engaging in deception.  This refusal need not be 
evasion if the lawyer reminds the opponent outright of the limits of 
full candor where client confidences are at stake.  Justice and the 
avoidance of harm do not require lawyers to place all cards on the 
table.209 
B. CLIENTS: LOYALTY WITH CANDOR 
Clients who commit their legal matters to the care of lawyers are 
entitled to the protections of the ethical duty of loyalty, the exercise of 
independent professional judgment, and the rendering of candid advice.210  
They are also entitled to the lawyer’s exercise of competence and diligence 
in protecting the client’s interests and pursuing the client’s objectives.211  
The Comment to Rule 1.3 echoes the Preamble, with a qualified 
endorsement of zealous advocacy: 
A lawyer must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the 
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s 
behalf.  A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every 
advantage that might be realized for a client. . . .  The lawyer’s 
duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of 
offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in 
the legal process with courtesy and respect.212 
The exercise of good faith and honest dealing in negotiations should be 
added to the “courtesy” and “respect” the zealous advocate may properly 
 
208. Id. at 92. 
209. Id. 
210. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“Loyalty 
and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”); id. r. 
2.1 (Advisor). 
211. See id. r. 1.1 (Competence); id. r. 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of 
Authority Between Client and Lawyer); id. r. 1.3 (Diligence). 
212. See id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1.  Cf. id. Preamble 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the 
client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”). 
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extend to others.213  The ethical duty of loyalty does not entitle a client to a 
hyper-zealous lawyer who treats adversaries or their counsel with bad faith 
or dishonest dealing.214  Stated more directly, a lawyer need not (and should 
not) lie for a client, even if a loophole in the professional conduct rules or 
the “generally accepted conventions” of an area of practice seem to permit 
it.215  Moreover, a lawyer should never forget that clients (or, for 
organizational clients, their constituent members) are themselves human 
beings with the capacity for exercising moral judgment and recognizing and 
respecting the humanity of their adversaries, and even for understanding 
them to be their neighbors.216  As James Boyd White frames the question: 
What kind of victory does [the client] really want?  Here it is a 
great mistake to assume, as many people do, that clients naturally 
want victory at any cost, including that of unscrupulous behavior 
from their lawyers.  Some do, of course, no doubt about it, but 
 
213. See id. Preamble 2 (“As a negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client 
but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others.”).  Deborah L. Rhode states these 
essential points well: 
At its core, the relationship between lawyers and clients is one of agency, which 
imposes fiduciary obligations of competence, confidentiality and loyalty.  Yet these 
obligations do not always trump competing concerns.  Lawyers also need to consider 
the potential harms to other affected parties, and core values such as honesty, fairness 
and good faith on which any effective justice system depends. 
Deborah L. Rhode, Personal Integrity and Professional Ethics, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: 
TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 28, 29 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010). 
214. Tim Dare compares the “hyper-zealous lawyer,” who is “concerned not merely to 
secure the[] client’s legal rights, but to pursue any advantage obtainable for the[] client through 
the law,” with the “merely-zealous lawyer.”  TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE 
OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 76-77 (2009).  He notes: 
It is often in our interest to have more than we are entitled to under law, and no doubt 
we are often interested in having more than our bare legal entitlement.  But this is of 
no moment to the merely-zealous lawyer.  Their professional obligation is to pursue 
the client’s legal rights zealously.  They are to be partisan in the sense that they must 
bring all of their professional skills to bear upon the task of securing their client’s 
rights.  But they are under no obligation to pursue interests that go beyond the law. 
Id. at 76.  Dare then posits “[t]hat not every lawful advantage that can be obtained through law is a 
legal entitlement, and that the duty of zealous advocacy requires lawyers to pursue only their 
client’s legal entitlements.  The duty of zealous advocacy, this is to say, is a duty of mere- rather 
than hyper-zeal.”  Id. at 81.  This is “because [lawyers’] professional roles are structured by the 
function of the institution to which they belong, and the function of that institution is to determine 
and protect legal entitlements, not to secure every possible lawful advantage.”  Id. 
215. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); see Steele, 
supra note 47, at 1393 (“Lawyers cannot hide behind fidelity to client to rationalize deceitful 
negotiation.  Not only is it unrealistic to believe that many clients actually instruct lawyers to 
behave in a deceitful manner, a lawyer’s code of ethics encourages him to guide the client away 
from any such thoughts.” (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1983))); see also Rubin, supra note 69, at 593 (“Client avarice and hostility neither control 
the lawyer’s conscience nor measure his ethics.”).   
216. See McGinniss, Virtue and Advice, supra note 5, at 42-43 (“In engaging the client as a 
‘neighbor,’ and as a ‘subject,’ the lawyer should also encourage the client to see the persons with 
whom they have disputes in a similar light.” (footnote omitted)). 
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others realize that such an attitude is childish, impractical, and 
inconsistent with their basic sense of themselves.  Many clients in 
fact want what they are entitled to and no more, and welcome the 
opportunity to deal with a lawyer who respects the decencies of 
life, as they themselves do.  And they know in addition that the 
lawyer who is a shyster to others will often be a shyster to his 
client.217 
At the same time, however, a lawyer’s moral duty of respect—
encompassing good faith and honest dealing—does not require a lawyer to 
sacrifice the client’s rights or interests by making disclosures or taking 
other affirmative actions to ensure the adverse party receives what the 
lawyer believes is a substantively fair or just outcome.218  Certainly, in the 
advising role, the lawyer may properly offer the client an opinion about 
what substantive fairness or justice requires in a given circumstance.219  But 
in the absence of the client’s agreement to alter the substantive 
arrangements, the lawyer should rely upon the lawyer’s own exercise of 
good faith and honest dealing in the negotiating process to satisfy moral 
concerns about fairness to the opposing party.220 
 
217. White, The Ethics of Argument, supra note 3, at 892; see also Loder, supra note 53, at 
101 (“The belief that clients prefer unethical lawyers also grossly underestimates clients’ abilities 
to appreciate the pervasive impact of a ‘hired gun’ mentality on the lawyer’s overall integrity and 
effectiveness.”); Clark D. Cunningham, What Do Clients Want from Their Lawyers?, 2013 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 143, 146 (2013) (citing finding by the “leading researcher in this area, the American 
social psychologist Tom Tyler,” that “[c]lients care most about the process―having their 
problems or disputes settled in a way that they view as fair, second most important is achieving a 
fair settlement, the least important factor is the number of assets they end up winning” (quoting 
Tom Tyler, Client Perceptions of Litigation―What Counts: Process or Result?, TRIAL 40 (July 
1988))). 
218. Walter W. Steele, Jr., for example, recommends this aspirational standard for lawyer 
negotiators:  
[W]hen serving as a negotiator lawyers should strive for a result that is objectively 
fair.  Principled negotiation between lawyers on behalf of clients should be a 
cooperative process, not an adversarial process.  Consequently, whenever two or more 
lawyers are negotiating on behalf of clients, each lawyer owes the other an obligation 
of total candor and total cooperation to the extent required to insure that the result is 
fair. 
Steele, supra note 47, at 1403; see also supra note 179 (discussing and critiquing Carrie Menkel-
Meadow’s proposal of norms for lawyer negotiation directed to the substantive fairness of 
outcomes). 
219. See MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (Advisor); see 
also McGinniss, Virtue and Advice, supra note 5, at 10 (“[T]he role adopted by the advising 
lawyer under [Rule 2.1] is one of a verbal safeguard standing between the client and the potential 
impact of the client’s actions on third-party or societal interests, and speaking out”—to the 
client―“as necessary and proper to protect interests beyond the client’s alone.”); Steele, supra 
note 47, at 1403 (“From the client’s perspective, a primary motivation for seeking a lawyer’s help 
should be the expectation of a fair negotiation.”). 
220. As Tim Dare expresses a similar point about lawyers and the proper exercise of the 
virtue of generosity: 
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Gerald B. Wetlaufer opines the legal profession has “embrace[d] a 
discourse on the ethics of lying that is uncritical, self-justificatory and 
largely unpersuasive.”221  He explains: 
Our motives in this seem reasonably clear.  Put simply, we seek 
the best of both worlds.  On the one hand, we would capture as 
much of the available surplus as we can.  In doing so, we enrich 
our clients and ourselves.  Further, we gain for ourselves a 
reputation for personal power and instrumental effectiveness.  And 
we earn the right to say we can never be conned.  At the same 
time, on the other hand, we assert our claims to a reputation for 
integrity and personal virtue, to the high status of a profession, and 
to the legitimacy of the system within which we live and work.  
Even Gorgias, for all of his powers of rhetoric, could not 
convincingly assert both of these claims.  Nor can we.222 
The ethical obligations a lawyer advocate owes a client to pursue the 
client’s interests with loyalty and zealousness are powerful and imperative.  
Nevertheless, they do not require the lawyer to forego the virtue of honesty 
or to compromise personal or professional integrity, using Machiavellian 
means to achieve the client’s objectives. 
C. COMMUNITY: JUSTICE FROM FAIR PROCESSES 
Even from the standpoint of instrumental effectiveness, a negotiating 
lawyer needs to be, as Anthony Kronman has said, an “expert in 
cooperation, and be able to discern where those opportunities for 
cooperation lie.”223  Such opportunities are less likely to be found if lawyers 
are presumed dishonest because their ethical standards are construed to 
allow them to be so.224  Frohnen and Eck ask negotiating lawyers to 
consider: 
 
Lawyers who attempt to be generous by sacrificing their clients’ rights—whether 
by not merely-zealously pursuing those rights or perhaps by simply not advising the 
client that the rights are available—display not the virtue of generosity, but instead a 
vice, “something like arrogance”: “. . . being so completely sure of the rightness of 
one’s own views and the irrelevance of anybody else’s, even the views of the person 
whose rights are at issue, that one simply forces one’s views on the client.” 
DARE, supra note 214, at 78 (quoting R.E. Ewin, Personal Morality and Professional Ethics: The 
Lawyer’s Duty of Zeal, 6 INT’L J. OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 39 (1991)). 
221. Wetlaufer, supra note 106, at 1272; see also supra note 6 (on Plato’s Gorgias). 
222. Wetlaufer, supra note 106, at 1272. 
223. KRONMAN, supra note 106, at 153; see also Cohen, supra note 97, at 744 (“Respecting 
the other party will facilitate his or her cooperation which, if it affects the outcome at all, will 
usually be to one’s benefit.”).  
224. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 47, at 1402 (“That lawyers should not deceive, should not 
mislead, or should not overreach is too much a part of the common morality to be ignored much 
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What happens when each person becomes master of his or her 
own words?  We suggest that, before the bar grants that punishing 
lies is simply too burdensome or that lying should not be punished 
once everyone lies and expects lies, it should explore fully the 
probable costs to clients, third parties, and society as a whole as 
well as the legal profession itself.  [In a] society in which words 
and gestures cannot be counted upon to mean what they have 
meant in the past, what we take on trust in any conversation they 
shall mean (rather than what their current master wills them to 
mean), will cease to exist as communication and common actions 
become haphazard, unreliable, and in the end impossible.225 
The call to virtuous negotiation asks: what kind of persons and 
professionals do lawyers aspire to be, and within what kind of legal 
community do they aspire to practice?226  It also asks lawyers to consider 
how their conduct in negotiation either positively or negatively impacts the 
fairness of the processes by which legal matters are resolved in our broader 
community and the public’s perception of justice in our legal system. 
As previously emphasized, the ideal of fairness to which I urge lawyers 
to aspire does not focus on the substantive outcome of the negotiation.227  
Instead, it inheres in the concept of good faith and the honest dealing that 
the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct already 
calls upon negotiating lawyers to express in their words and actions.228  It 
bears similarities to Peter J. Henning’s concept of authenticity, which he 
describes as a component of honesty in the practice of law.229  I agree with 
him that it is.230  It is also more than that.  Good faith negotiating means not 
 
longer.  Normative negotiating conduct between lawyers cannot survive as a set of values distinct 
from values held by society at large.”). 
225. Frohnen & Eck, supra note 119, at 453-54 (footnote omitted). 
226. Cf. White, The Ethics of Argument, supra note 3, at 879 (“I also think it is important 
what kind of person I am and what sort of community I help to constitute, and I know that to make 
myself a lawyer is to give myself a mind of a certain character or cast, and that this is in large 
measure determined by what happens in argument.”); id. at 880 (observing that the tendency of 
the practice of the profession to improve the character “is greatly affected by the nature of the 
ethical community that one establishes with other lawyers and judges”). 
227. See supra notes 68-69, 178-79, and accompanying text. 
228. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); supra 
note 33 and accompanying text. 
229. See Henning, supra note 139, at 222 (describing an honest lawyer’s “authentic 
expression” as “one that comprehends fairly the lawyer’s (and in certain circumstances the 
client’s) intentions,” and as implicating “the lawyer has a further obligation to ensure that the 
representation of the client is fair both to the client and to others, including courts and 
opponents”).  
230. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text; cf. Rubin, supra note 69, at 590 (“[A]ll 
lawyers know that good faith requires conduct beyond simple honesty.”).  For Judge Alvin B. 
Rubin, “honesty” is essentially equivalent to “candor” (which involves a degree of completeness 
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only using words objectively grounded in fact and law,231 but also 
refraining from coercive threats, incivility, or psychological manipulation: 
it means negotiating with respect for your neighbor―lawyer or party―as a 
human being with fundamental dignity.232  It means advocating for the 
client’s interests while still embracing “accountability to the good of the 
client.”233  As I have said in the context of the advisor role, a lawyer’s best 
service for the client’s good “includes a commitment by the lawyer to 
refrain from, purposely or not, becoming the occasion for the client to 
experience avoidable deformation of moral character through the actions 
taken to address the client’s legal situation.”234  It means being faith’s 
keeper in the practice of law, and not its breaker.235 
I do not, however, recommend revising the professional conduct rules 
to create a separate, codified ethical duty of fair dealing in negotiation.  In a 
1980 discussion draft of professional conduct rules governing negotiations, 
the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards proposed to 
include a provision stating, “In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be 
fair in dealing with other participants.”236  This provision, along with 
others, met with strong resistance and ultimately was not adopted.237  In 
 
and openness beyond simple truth telling), and “good faith” requires a lawyer to avoid facilitating 
a resolution in favor of the client that is substantively “unconscionable.”  See id. at 589-90. 
231. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); supra note 63 
and accompanying text. 
232. See Cohen, supra note 97, at 743; supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.  To be 
clear, stating the consequences of a failure to resolve a legal matter through successful 
negotiation―which could certainly include a “threat” of litigation and its attendant costs and 
potential liabilities―does not constitute a coercive threat for purposes of evaluating the good or 
bad faith of a negotiating lawyer.  And in assessing what constitutes bad faith “psychological 
manipulation” of an adverse party, and what is instead simply good faith “psychological pressure” 
to motivate a favorable deal for one’s client, there is a degree of subjective judgment involved: a 
lawyer with practical wisdom, and possessed of the virtue of integrity, will be better equipped to 
recognize the boundary between good faith consistent with zealous advocacy and the duty of 
loyalty, and bad faith negotiation tactics.  See McGinniss, Virtue Ethics, supra note 4, at 37-38, 
46-48 (discussing the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, and integrity as the 
unifying virtue for the practice of law). 
233. VISCHER, supra note 150, at 28, quoted in McGinniss, Virtue and Advice, supra note 5, 
at 42. 
234. McGinniss, Virtue and Advice, supra note 5, at 42; see also id. at 38-45 (offering, “[f]or 
those seeking a deeper vision of what it means professionally and personally to relate to another 
human being as an advisor on the law,” the ideal for a lawyer’s service as a “trustworthy 
neighbor” to the client; and examining the Biblical moral principle of agape, or “sacrificial love,” 
as applied to the lawyer-client relationship). 
235. Cf. supra notes 2, 117, 152, and accompanying text (discussing Machiavelli’s view of 
faith keeping and faith breaking).   
236. ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of Prof’l Standards, Discussion Draft of the Model Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.2(a) (1980).   
237. See Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 30, at 163 n.219.  Walter W. Steele, Jr. criticizes the 
1980 proposed Rule 4.2(a) on several grounds: 
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2002, the ABA’s Section of Litigation approved and published Ethical 
Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations stating, “A lawyer’s conduct in 
negotiating a settlement should be characterized by honor and fair 
dealing.”238  Such formal written guidance, though non-binding, does serve 
the purpose of communicating institutional support for fair processes in 
negotiation.239  State and local bar associations should also consider 
 
As proposed the rule could have become a vehicle for lawyers with one set of values 
to characterize other, honest lawyers with different values as “unfair” and in violation 
of the rule.   
As if anticipating such unintended and undesirable results, the drafters of the 
proposed rule added an explanation of fairness within the context of negotiation.  
Their approach is conservative.  One part of the explanation of “fairness” stated: 
“Fairness in negotiation implies that representations by or in behalf of one party to the 
other party be truthful.  This requirement is reflected in contract law, particularly the 
rules relating to fraud and mistake.  A lawyer involved in negotiations has an 
obligation to assure as far as practicable that the negotiations conform to the law’s 
requirements in this regard.”   
In reality, that commentary does little more than ask lawyers to follow existing 
case precedents concerning truth, concealment, fraud, and mistake. 
Steele, supra note 47, at 1400-01 (quoting ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of Prof’l Standards, 
Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.2 cmt. (1980)).  Steele’s criticisms 
notwithstanding, the 1980 comment does provide helpful insight into what good faith negotiation 
should include and what it can accomplish for clients: 
As an aspect of the duty to deal fairly with other parties, a lawyer should not engage in 
the pretense of negotiation when the client has no real intention of seeking agreement.  
In particular, it is dishonest to pretend to negotiate when the real purpose is to prevent 
the other party from pursuing an alternative course of action.  More generally, a 
lawyer acting as negotiator should recognize that maintaining a fair and courteous 
tenor in negotiations can contribute to a satisfactory resolution.  This is particularly 
true when the parties to the negotiation have a continuing relationship with each other, 
as in collective bargaining or in negotiations between divorcing parents concerning 
child custody.  An agreement that is the product of open, forbearing, and fair-minded 
negotiation can be a demonstration by the lawyers of the conduct that the parties 
themselves should display toward each other.  
ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of Prof’l Standards, Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 4.2 cmt. (1980). 
238. Amer. Bar Ass’n, Sec. of Litig., Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations § 2.3, at 
3 (2002). 
239. Douglas R. Richmond, however, criticizes this Guideline as being “more hortatory than 
helpful.”  Richmond, supra note 72, at 250.  He elaborates: 
But by whose standards is “honor” in settlement negotiations measured?  Perhaps a 
court’s where negotiations are linked to pending litigation, but what of the many 
instances where they are not?  And what constitutes “fair dealing”?  Lawyers typically 
think of “fair dealing” in terms of contract law’s implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, but even there the concept is imprecise. . . .  The Preamble to the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct states that “[a]s [a] negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result 
advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with 
others.”  Of course, a result advantageous to one’s client may not be fair to another 
party, and “fair dealing” may require more than honesty.  The Guidelines are no help; 
their drafters acknowledge that whatever fair dealing may be, it is not a professional 
responsibility mandate, but rather a “best practice.” 
Id. (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
Preamble 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008)) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 & 
cmt. D (1981) and ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations § 2.3, at 3-4 (2002)). 
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adopting standards for “good faith” negotiation practice similar to those 
which have existed in the District of Columbia since 1996, which include 
some concrete norms for fair processes.240  With or without formal 
guidelines, however, the most indispensable means for promoting these 
negotiation ideals is informal communication within the bench and bar 
(both one-on-one and in group gatherings) about their importance for 
lawyers, clients, and the public, and why aspiring to meet these ideals of 
good faith and honest dealing is in the best interest of justice.241 
Virtuous negotiation promotes human flourishing in a legal 
community, and in many cases, will benefit the individual lawyers and 
clients who participate in that community.  Even so, it is important to 
emphasize that a lawyer should deal honestly and act in good faith because 
it is intrinsically right and valuable to do so, rather than being focused on 
the extrinsic rewards and advantages that such good conduct might 
obtain.242  At times, the immediate rewards of breaking faith in negotiation 
may be substantial.  By building a foundation of virtuous character, and 
understanding good conduct as good for its own sake and not for what may 
be gained by it, a lawyer is best prepared to act with integrity even when 
doing so means sacrificing extrinsic rewards or enduring costly 
consequences. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If Machiavelli were commenting on this article, I imagine he would 
call much of what I have proposed a mere “imagination” of the truth about 
the practice of law and exclaim that “it is so far from how one lives [as a 
lawyer] to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what 
should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation.”243  He would 
then say the “effectual truth” of lawyer negotiation is that one must know 
how to deal honestly and keep faith when that is useful (including for 
appearances and reputation) and how to deal dishonestly and break faith 
when that is more useful for the client’s (and usually the lawyer’s) 
benefit.244  He would also advise that being virtuous as a lawyer in 
 
240. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (discussing mentoring programs and 
apprenticeship organizations as examples of means by which a legal community may promote 
intrinsic values and professional virtues for negotiations). 
242. As Judge Alvin B. Rubin observes, “Good conduct exacts more than mere convenience.  
It is not sufficient to call on personal self-interest; this is the standard created by the thesis that the 
same adversary met today may be faced again tomorrow, and one had best not prejudice that 
future engagement.”  Rubin, supra note 69, at 589.   
243. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 2, at 61. 
244. Id. at 61, 71. 
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negotiation means knowing when the situation makes one of these 
approaches more advantageous and knowing how to “use the fox” when 
necessary for the sake of power or gain.245  Finally, he might suggest that 
negotiating lawyers who strive to practice with good faith and honest 
dealing in every negotiation will “come to ruin” when other lawyers break 
faith with them.246 
As to the last point, it is sadly true that a negotiating lawyer who 
exercises the virtue of honesty, and anticipates reciprocation from 
colleagues in the bar, will find occasions for disappointment.  But 
acknowledging that the lawyers with whom we are negotiating might tell 
lies or deceive us does not entitle us to relax our own moral standards 
concerning dishonesty or deception.  Nor does it justify adopting 
professional conduct rules or interpretive comments that authorize such 
behavior247 or encouraging lawyers who are entering the legal profession to 
place their integrity at moral risk by how they play the negotiating 
“game.”248  Instead, we should renew our commitment to promote the 
values of respect and fairness of process, and teach the lawyers within our 
sphere of influence to be keepers of faith even though others may break 
it.249 
To the extent our legal communities have become infected with 
dishonesty (with varying degrees of ill health), Machiavelli would be 
pessimistic about remedial efforts (even if he were convinced a culture of 
honesty would be “effectual”): 
[I]n the beginning of the illness it is easy to cure and difficult to 
recognize, but in the progress of time, when it has not been 
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entice each other to settle for the moral status quo, rather than aspire to professional lives 
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being told that someone has to do the job, that if we don’t do the job someone worse 
will do the job.  Things have to be done in office that cannot be done with moral 
comfort in private life, but that is the way office (including the license to practice law) 
is. 
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249. Cf. Steele, supra note 47, at 1400 (stressing that “[t]o admit . . . changing current 
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recognized and treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to 
recognize and difficult to cure.  So it happens in affairs of state, 
because when one recognizes from afar the evils that arise in a 
state (which is not given but to one who is prudent), they are soon 
healed; but when they are left to grow because they were not 
recognized, to the point that everyone recognizes them, there is no 
longer any remedy for them.250 
I, on the other hand, will sound a note of measured optimism: although 
dishonesty is a cultural disease that is ultimately incurable, it may 
nonetheless be made less pathological (and less contagious).251  And each 
lawyer is professionally and personally responsible to contribute to the 
remedial effort.252  James Boyd White, in concluding his Socratic reflection 
on the ethics of argument, offers a wise observation about lawyerly 
language: 
[W]e are responsible for how we speak and who we are. . . .  We 
cannot escape the fact that whenever we speak we redefine for the 
moment the resources of our culture and in doing so establish a 
character for ourselves and a relation with another, the person to 
whom we speak.  Who shall we be?  What relation shall we have 
with our language?  What kind of relations shall we have with 
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others?  These are the central questions of human life, and they are 
present with special force and clarity in the life of the lawyer.253 
As Socrates might have said: true words are not only good in 
themselves; they are healing to a lawyer’s spirit, and an infectious 
testimony to others.254 
 
253. White, The Ethics of Argument, supra note 3, at 895.  
254. See supra note 1 (quoting Socrates: “False words are not only evil in themselves, but 
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